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EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT

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VOLUME XXXIII

APRIL 1951

NUMBER 2

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## A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS OF ZECHARIAH 1-8

By DONALD FAY ROBINSON

Cooperstown, New York

It has long been believed by most authorities that chapters 9-14 of the book of Zechariah are from the second century B.C. and have no relation to the prophet under whose name they appear. That even the first eight chapters are not entirely from one hand is also generally assumed. But the apocalyptic visions of chapters 1-6 are usually accepted as an early example of this type of writing and the work of Zechariah; the interpolations are found elsewhere. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the apocalyptic visions are late, and that the genuine Zecharian material is only the small nucleus of a second century expansion.

Zechariah 1-8 is made up of a series of more or less independent oracles:<sup>1</sup>

1. An oracle on obedience (1:1-6).
2. A vision of horses (or horsemen) and a prophecy of the restoration of Jerusalem (1:7-17).
3. A vision of four horns and four carpenters (1:18-21).
4. A vision of a man with a measuring line (2:1-5).
5. Several more or less fragmentary oracles on the restoration of Jerusalem (2:6-13).

6. A vision of the purification of Joshua the high priest (3:1-10).
7. A vision of a golden candlestick and two olive trees (4:1-6a, 10b-14).
8. Two misplaced oracles on Zerubbabel (4:6b-10a).
9. A vision of a flying roll (5:1-4).
10. A vision of a woman in an ephah (5:5-11).
11. A vision of four chariots (6:1-8).
12. A badly mutilated oracle on the making of crowns for Joshua the high priest (6:9-15).
13. Part of an oracle on fasting (7:1-7).
14. An oracle on true judgment (7:8-14).
15. An oracle on the restoration of Jerusalem (8:1-17).
16. The remainder of the oracle on fasting (8:18-19).
17. An oracle on the future glory of Jerusalem (8:20-23).

With three exceptions, each of these oracles is introduced by a variation of one or the other of two verbal formulas. The first of these is, "the word of the Lord came unto Zechariah" (or "unto me"). This introduces oracles 1, 2, 8 (the second part), 12, 13 (twice), 14, 15 and 16. The second formula in its fullest form (6:1) is, "And I turned and lifted up my eyes and looked and behold." This introduces oracles 3, 4, 9, 11, and (in somewhat altered form) 7 and 10. An abbreviated variant appears immediately after the first formula in oracle 2. Only oracles 5, 6 and 17 have no introductory formula.

If one temporarily disregards oracle 2, which has both formulas, it will be seen that all the oracles introduced by the first formula are simple, literal utterances, and that all those introduced by the second formula are symbolic visions, which are interpreted to the prophet by the angel of the Lord. In other words, by a mechanical and entirely objective criterion three quarters of the first eight chapters of Zechariah can be divided into two parts, one of which has nothing resembling apocalyptic writing, and the other of which has nothing else. Surely it is not too fantastic to suppose that this indicates a divergence of authorship.

The remaining material can be allocated to one or the other part without difficulty. Twice in oracle 5 appears the statement (with slight variations), "and ye shall know that the Lord of hosts hath sent me." This also occurs in oracles 8 and 12.<sup>2</sup> Moreover the contents of oracle 5 are non-apocalyptic. It can safely be assigned

to the first group of oracles. Oracle 17 closely resembles other material in this group and can also be assigned to it. Indeed the oracle may be a continuation of oracle 15, cut off by the misplaced conclusion of oracle 13.

In the second oracle the utterance of the angel, 1:14b-17, has many verbal similarities to oracle 15. On the other hand the preceding material, 1:8-14a, resembles the apocalyptic oracles and opens with an abbreviated form of the second formula. This in turn is immediately preceded by a variant of the first formula. If the entire passage is divided on the basis of its affinities, verses 1:7, 14b-17 fall into the first group of oracles and verses 1:8-14a into the second. The first of these constitutes a complete oracle; but verse 14a, which is certainly part of the second, makes sense only as an introduction to verse 14b. It is perhaps not too arbitrary to suppose that here we have an oracle of the first group which has been expanded by the writer of the second group.

Finally, oracle 6 shows closest affinities to the apocalyptic visions. The angel of the Lord figures largely here; and the angel of the Lord appears elsewhere only in this second group of oracles. Furthermore, though the introductory formula is lacking, the oracle begins, "And he shewed me," a phrase closely related to the variant introduction of oracles 7 and 10. It seems safe to assign this oracle, as it stands, to the second group. But here as in oracle 2 words are put into the angel's mouth which seem to come from the other group of oracles. These words begin, "Thus saith the Lord of hosts," a phrase which appears some nineteen times in material assigned on other grounds to the first group, but never in material of the second group.<sup>3</sup> In verse 8 reference is made to "my servant the Branch," an allusion, presumably to Zerubbabel, which also occurs in oracle 12. The entire passage (3:7-10) can stand alone, as do the unprefaced oracles in 2:6-13; but it is introduced by a second-group sentence that is meaningless outside of this or a similar context. It would seem that here as in oracle 2 we have the writer of the apocalyptic material using material from the first group of oracles.

The first eight chapters of Zechariah are thus divided into two groups of material. The first comprises 1:1-7, 14b-17; 2:6-13; 3:7-10; 4:6b-10a; 6:9-8:23. The second comprises 1:8-14a; 1:18-2:5; 3:1-6; 4:1-6a; 4:10b-6:8. The first group includes all references to Zechariah and Zerubbabel, and indeed all personal names except

that of Joshua the high priest. In the two instances of what seems to be a conflate of material from both groups, the material from the first group appears to be the older. The material in the second group, with its horns (1:18), its flying roll (5:1) and its mountains of brass (6:1), resembles the apocayptic writing of the second century B.C. and later. In the conflate passages phrases clearly belonging to the second group introduce material from the first in such fashion as to make it seem unlikely that the second group of oracles ever existed independently.

It is suggested on the basis of the foregoing analysis that the first group of oracles contains all the authentic utterances of Zechariah; that the second group was written for the position it now occupies; and that Zechariah 1-8, as we now have it, is a second century expansion of a small and possibly already expanded collection of Zecharian oracles.<sup>4</sup>

It may be possible to date the expanded document more exactly.

Some of the mutilations in Zechariah are certainly accidental. But the mutilation of the oracle in 6:9-15 seems to be in part deliberate. In verse 11 we find a command to make "crowns," though only Joshua is to wear them. Then in verse 12 we have a reference to Zerubbabel, "the Branch." Finally in verse 13 we read that he "shall sit and rule upon his throne; and he shall be a priest upon his throne; and the counsel of peace shall be between them both." For the second clause the Septuagint reads, "he shall be priest at his right hand." Quite evidently the original oracle concerned the making of crowns for both Joshua and Zerubbabel, and someone has altered the passage, not too skilfully, to put both crowns on one head.

This points to a definite date. At the feast of tabernacles in 153 B.C. Jonathan Maccabee, who already was in command of the Jewish army and, at least in the eyes of the patriots, the civil governor of Judaea, officially assumed the highpriesthood also. The dual office thus created continued in effect for 75 years, till the death of Jannaeus in 78 B.C. The mutilation of this oracle almost certainly was made during this period, and most probably at the beginning of it.

The appointment of a warrior to the highpriesthood was unprecedented if not illegal under a strict interpretation of Jewish law. It required as it were a special dispensation from Jehovah. This is

provided by the story in 3:1-10 of the purification of Joshua. This story too then points to 153 B.C.

It seems highly probable that the present form of the book of Zechariah is to be assigned to this date. But it does not follow that the entire expansion is to be so dated. As has already been shown, the story of Joshua's purification is somewhat different in style from the other visions. Moreover there are seven visions without it, and seven is a much more usual number than eight in writing of this sort.

But perhaps the strongest reason for supposing the original expansion to have been earlier than 153 B.C. is provided by the vision of the golden candlestick. The two olive trees that flank this candlestick are interpreted to be "the two anointed ones, that stand by the Lord of the whole earth." In other words, this vision envisages the secular governorship and the highpriesthood as independent offices."

If the story of Joshua's purification is dropped as an interpolation, the vision of the candlestick will occupy the central position among the visions, with three leading up to it and three building down from it. The genuine Zecharian oracles are concerned with the dual government of an independent Jewry. It seems wholly possible that Zechariah was chosen and this expansion of it written by way of encouraging a latter-day attempt to establish the kingdom which Zerubabel and Joshua had failed to achieve, in which there should be both secular and ecclesiastical heads.

In that case, the original expansion was probably made sometime between 167 and 153 B.C. But to find among the rapidly shifting events of those fourteen years the exact point that fits the conditions indicated by the seven visions is no easy task.

The first and last visions are structurally parallel and, it is to be presumed, mutually supplementary. According to the first, "all the earth sitteth still, and is at rest." According to the last, "these that go toward the north country have quieted my spirit in the north country." This would seem to mean that political conditions in Syria are favorable for a Jewish coup d'état.

In the second vision, the four horns are probably the four kingdoms of Nebuchadnezzar's dream in Daniel, Babylon, Media, Persia and Greece. But who are the four carpenters? Are they to be taken as four individuals, or four groups, or four factors in the restoration

of Israel? Or is the number four merely antithetical to the number of horns?

The fifth and sixth visions also, it is to be supposed, contain specific references. If Wellhausen's restoration of the fifth is accepted, this says that theft and perjury have long been going on (presumably in high places) unchecked; but that a day of reckoning is coming. The sixth vision seems to refer to some particular source or embodiment of wickedness, which is to be removed to "the land of Shinar." This may mean Babylonia, or be used symbolically to denote some other place.

A possible date for the fulfilment of these conditions is 164 B.C., just after the death of Antiochus IV, when the civil strife that broke out in Syria over the succession beguiled Judas into his unfortunate attack on the Syrian fortress at Jerusalem. In that case the fifth and sixth visions would probably refer to the perfidious high priest Menelaus, who was deposed and exiled about that time. Or possibly the four carpenters are to be interpreted as the four Maccabees, John, Simon, Judas and Jonathan. If so, the date of the expansion must be set after the death of the fifth brother, Eleazar, in 162 B.C., and before the death of Judas in 161 B.C. The fifth and sixth visions would then refer to Menelaus' equally infamous successor, Alcimus, or to the whole line of high priests for the previous ten years. And the most likely date would be just after the defeat of Nicanor at Adasa in February, 161, a defeat whose anniversary was celebrated thereafter as an annual festival.<sup>6</sup>

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Detailed consideration of minor interpolations is not germane to the argument and has not been attempted. Similarly, the King James version has been used throughout, and corrections of that version and of the text behind it have for the most part been ignored as irrelevant.

<sup>2</sup>4:9, 6:15.

<sup>3</sup>*Koh amar YHWH*. The phrase used in the apocalyptic material is *n'um YHWH*; and even this occurs only twice, 2:5 and 5:4.

<sup>4</sup>In addition to single verses here and there, the passages commonly considered post-Zecharian interpolations are 1:2-6, 7:8-14. Some also reject 8:1-17, 20-23.

<sup>5</sup>It may be that the chaotic state of the fourth chapter is due partly to an attempt to bring this vision into harmony with the actual conditions under Jonathan, and partly to displacements caused by the insertion of 3:1-10.

<sup>6</sup>It is interesting to note in this connection that according to Josephus, *Antt* 12:10, 11, Judas Maccabee was high priest 164-161 B.C., and his brother Simon general of the army. First Maccabees does not substantiate this. But it may be that the Maccabean following repudiated Alcimus and looked upon Judas as the true high priest.



## THE DEVOTION TO THE MOTHER OF CHRIST IN CATHOLIC SPIRITUALITY

By W. NORMAN PITTENGER  
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In our contemporary interest in "ecumenicity", it is often and rightly said that one of the vital needs amongst Christians is an understanding of attitudes and beliefs, religious practices and devotional usages, held or employed by those who have a point of view differing from one's own. The writer has learned enormously, for example, from his attempt to enter sympathetically into the significance of "the Word of God", as this concept is held by Protestant Christians; similarly, his effort to grasp, so far as he is able, the meaning which those in the Calvinist tradition find in *gratia sola* has been deeply rewarding to him. Perhaps, therefore, this paper may be of some value to those who wish to see something of the significance which many of us in the Catholic tradition find in devotion to the Mother of our Lord Jesus Christ.

There is an additional reason for a careful statement of this devotion, especially pertinent at this time. The Roman Church has recently announced its intention of proclaiming, as a dogma to be imposed upon all its members, the "Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary." This dogma asserts that the Mother of Christ was bodily taken into heaven at the moment of death, and now is in heaven, both in body and soul, as the single instance amongst all men of such an assumption. There is no Biblical evidence for such a belief and the "traditional grounds" adduced for it are both late and unimpressive. The only argument which can be used to defend it is that it is "fitting" that it should be so. Here is mythology gone rampant, the result being a tendency amongst many to regard all concern with St. Mary as equally in the realm of sheer fable. Yet Eastern Orthodoxy, and Anglicans who would wish for a real devotion to the Mother of Christ, cannot and do not accept such a theory, and it is only fair that their position about the general



question should be given a generous hearing, despite the extremes to which Rome has seen fit to go.

One can assume that all Christians with an ecumenical spirit have a genuine desire to appreciate, so far as they can, a set of ideas and a kind of practice not their own and yet so important to others that they cannot envisage Christianity without it. It is not necessary to assume that devotion to St. Mary will make the same appeal to everyone; surely it is necessary to say that everyone who is concerned with the union of Christians and the widest possible mutual understanding amongst them will endeavour to enter with sympathy into such an exposition as is here attempted.

# I

In the first place, nobody who is an enlightened Christian of our day would give credence to the vast accumulation of tradition about St. Mary which finds so large a place in much popular Catholic devotion. By this we mean that there is little or no historical evidence for the stories about our Lady's conception and birth, her life, her death and what may have happened thereafter. Any value—and there is surely some value—which may be attached to the traditions is to be found in their witness to a deep devotion to her who is Mother of God-made-Man, precisely because she is his Mother and for no other reason. With Loisy, we must be ready to admit that about her, in one sense, we know *rien de rien*. The references to her in scripture are slight, many of them in anything but a complimentary sense—for in the gospels she is portrayed often enough as failing to understand Jesus or his mission.

And yet, granting this, there is one certain historical basis for the attitude taken in Catholic Christianity to St. Mary. That is simply that she *is* the Mother of Jesus, and that for historical Christianity of all kinds, Jesus is more than "a good man"—he is none other than the Word made flesh, dwelling amongst us. Now this means that St. Mary occupies a place which was occupied and can be occupied by no other human being: she is "the blest Mother of our Lord and Saviour", "the Bearer of the Incarnate Word." It is this place which makes it possible to understand the high dignity that is given to her, when (for example) the primitive or early Church put in her mouth the hymn—modelled on Hebrew psalm-models—called the *Magnificat*. It is this which gave rise to the tradition enshrined in the Third

Gospel, where the Mother of St. John Baptist is made to say, "Blessed art thou among women," while the Archangel Gabriel is represented as addressing her in the words, "Hail, thou art highly favoured, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women." Mary—or Miriam—is the Mother of Jesus, who is "the fruit of her womb"; for this reason, if for no other, she merits the *reverence* of those who accord to her Son that *worship* which belongs only to God-in-human-life.

In Catholic theology, a distinction is made between the adoration which belongs to God and the kind of veneration which may be paid to the Mother of his Incarnate Son's humanity. The former is called *latreia*; the latter *hyperdulia*—while to all other persons who may be venerated there can be given only *dulia* or the sort of "worship" which is, in a way, represented when in the English Marriage Office the words "with my body I thee worship" are employed. All creatures are *God's* creatures, created by him and sustained in being by him, hence indwelt by him; men, whoever or wherever they may be, are his "temples", in which the Holy Spirit makes his abode. But of St. Mary alone it may be said that she occupies an entirely unique place in the divine economy, for she was chosen, in the divine providence, to be the Mother of God's humanity, when he "came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man."

Lest there be misunderstanding at this point, it ought also to be said that the position held by the Blessed Mother is not dependent upon the historical accuracy of the tradition of the Virgin Birth. It is not the fact of her biological virginity, if it be an historically established fact, which gives her the place she holds; it is the fact, apprehended in the very moment of faith in him as the Incarnate Lord, that she is his Mother, which guarantees to her the title of uniqueness amongst women. As his Mother she has been called "Queen of Saints", in the sense that she has been supremely chosen by God to be his instrument in the world's redemption, in that through her conception and child-bearing the human nature by which God saved the world was born into the company of men.

Anyone who gives central place to the "gospel of Christ" must admit, with sorrow, that in the course of Christian history many abuses have found their way into the devotion to St. Mary. The reasons for this are many and various; we can mention the almost

inevitable, yet regrettable, assimilation of her devotion to that given some of the female divinities of the pagan world, as we can also see that the tendency to exalt our Lord in such a way that even his humanity became inaccessible to those who were indeed members of his mystical Body the Church led to a concentration upon his Mother, who at any rate was completely human and hence available to men and women; or we can cite the exaltation of virginity which appealed to the idealistic and idealizing mind in a crude and barbaric age. But these exaggerations and superstitions, which all of us would and should decry, do not negate the truth that St. Mary is the Mother of Christ and that Church was right, however unfortunate the phrase itself may have been, in calling her *Theotokos*, "bearer of him who is God." It would have been wiser to have said of her that she is "mother of his humanity", but the theory of the hypostatic union safeguarded the original phrase and responsible theologians have never said, nor implied, that she is "the Mother of God", excepting in the sense that she is the Mother of the humanity which God "assumed" by Incarnation.

## II

Now the tradition of the Church, for centuries, allowed that those who have lived holy lives in this world may be believed to pray in heaven for the members of the Church militant here in earth; the doctrine of "the communion of saints" has been by way of insisting that in some way, unknown to us, the well-being of the soldiers of Christ in this present world is included in the great intercession of the saints around the throne of God, as those who are now living may also pray for the departed and may ask "the great ones" to pray on their own behalf. Although there is no evidence as to the *how* of this great circle of prayer, the fact of it—and conviction as to its efficacy—is integral to the whole Christian tradition up to the time of the Reformation, when most Protestant Christians gave up the idea because they felt, sometimes with only too much justice, that it had interfered with the sole sovereignty and primacy belonging to God and to him "who is the Mediator between God and man." Yet some of us feel, and our feeling is shared by many in the Protestant communions, that something of warmth and beauty went out of Christianity with the loss of a deep and vivid sense of this com-

munion with the departed and this intimate fellowship with the saints of God who now enjoy the light of his presence.

The spirit of Catholic Christianity, in all its forms, is very plainly shown in the intimacy which the believer feels with those who have "gone before him with the sign of faith." Fellowship with the "patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs and confessors", above all with the Mother of Christ, has developed a peculiarly fragrant kind of spirituality, marked by a strong realization of the reality and presence, in this world of space and time, of the supernatural, and closely associated with a sacramental expression of religion, which finds the heart of devotion in the pleading of the Passion of Christ in the Holy Eucharist. As that "sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving" is offered, the Catholic Christian is strangely conscious of the co-presence with him of "angels and archangels, and all the company of heaven", joining with them in singing the great *Tersanctus* and entering with them into the very courts of heaven itself.

The ways in which this spirit is manifested differ from communion to communion—whether it be the Eastern Orthodox, with their amazing sense of mystery and their realization of the present reality of the Risen Christ with his saints; or the Roman Catholic West, with its insistence on the centrality of the Passion of Christ and its devotion to the Crucified Saviour in company with those who are sharers in his suffering; or the more restrained worship of the Anglican Prayer Book, which yet finds its chief expression in that "bounden duty and service", wherein Christ's "blessed passion and precious death, his mighty resurrection and glorious ascension" are celebrated, as the faithful "bless [God's] holy name for all [his] servants departed this life in [his] faith and fear", and remembering "the multitude of [his] saints", rejoice "in their fellowship" as they "laud and magnify [his] glorious name." There is something here which is so essential to the religion of the Catholic Christian, of whatever description, that he finds it difficult if not impossible to understand a type of Christianity in which it is either lacking or minimized. That it is entirely possible to hold firmly the basic truths of the gospel without this circumambient spirituality, he is of course aware, however; he can only wish that those who do not accept his position would endeavour sympathetically to understand it, as he (on his part) would seek to know their particular mode of religious expression. And he is quite ready to recognize the dangers which are

involved in the Catholic insistence on this wider significance of the doctrine of the communion of saints.

Yet Catholic Christianity has always maintained this set of convictions, and it is in this context that those of us who are of the Catholic tradition find no difficulty in making our own the words of the *Hail Mary*: "Hail Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with thee; blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb, Jesus. Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners now and in the hour of our death." The only phrases in this ancient devotion open to question would be "Holy Mary"—and that simply means "Saint Mary" for "Holy" (*saint, heilig*, etc., in other languages) is just the word for one sharing God's freely-given holiness; and "Mother of God"—and that, as have seen above, is rightly interpreted as meaning "Mother of the humanity of him who is God-made-man" (after the pattern of Chalcedonian Christology). To ask that she who is the "Bearer of the Incarnate Word" may remember before God all those who are "very members incorporate in the mystical Body of [his] Son, which is the blessed company of all faithful people", is hardly wrong, if one grants the basic position that the Church in heaven and the Church on earth are one as being the Body of Christ.

How any of the saints, including St. Mary, may make their intercessions before God's throne; how, if at all, they know of our trials and temptations in the Church militant; how their prayers—for certainly they pray, as do all of God's creatures each after his own fashion—are heard by God and with what result: concerning all of this we are of course ignorant. But the instinct which bids us pray to God and bids us ask others to pray to God for us, is not being abused when we include in our wide sweep the saints of God and the Mother of Jesus our Saviour. Where abuse comes in, and where the practice must be closely watched, is when any prayer or thought detracts in any way from the unique sovereignty of God himself and the unique mediatorial function of his Incarnate Son. Bishop Gore once remarked that he would pay to our Lady "all veneration short of worship"; with that remark we would express our complete agreement, for it is the necessary safeguard in Catholic piety.

### III

The exuberance of popular devotion can sometimes lead the devout

to extremes which theologians regard with grave concern. Yet, on the other hand, it must be said that sometimes popular devotion has got hold of some important truth which needs statement, even if the statement must be carefully guarded from error or superstition. And in the devotion to St. Mary, Catholic Christians believe that important truth has been expressed, sometimes without sufficient care. That truth is the unique place of our Lord's Mother, our rightful recognition of that place and our love for her who bore him whom we adore as our Lord, the tender feminine element in religion without which our faith may become harsh and over-austere. We have been told by psychologists that the Catholic attitude towards St. Mary includes within it the two ways in which humanity esteems womanhood: reverence for maternity and reverence for virginity. This fits in admirably with the picture of the Virgin Mother, and even those who see little or no historical evidence for the biological virginity of St. Mary should be able to recognize that "spiritual virginity", in the sense of total dedication to God's purposes, may at least be attributed to her, while the fact of her maternity is given in the gospel records.

St. Mary represents humanity in its highest reach towards God—she is the symbol for that open-ness to, and receptivity of mankind to, the divine initiative, as she is also the providentially chosen instrument for the unique action of God upon man. In a sense, surely, we may say that the whole of human history has been a movement towards the response which is attributed to the young Maiden: "Be it unto me according to thy word." So we can repeat the words of the poem, "our manhood's solitary boast", as we think of our Lady and her self-giving to God and his sovereign will. Mythologically put (we use the word in the meaning familiar to those who have studied the works of Niebuhr and Tillich), we may say that the whole redemption of the world hung upon her consent to "the message of the angel." So wonderfully does God respect man's freedom, so liberally does he give himself to those who are receptive to his will.

The writer is not at all concerned to defend the superstitions which have arisen around St. Mary, nor does he wish to be thought to approve of the extremes to which the devotion has sometimes gone. Indeed he would hold only to a "chastened" devotion to our Lady, such as may be found in the *Angelus* and in certain others of the traditional hymns and salutations and devotional acts. But for him-



self as one who has been brought up in this "way" and for many others who either by up-bringing or by slow development have come to accept it, he must bear witness to the richness and loveliness and warmth which such "chastened" devotion can bring to the Christian religion. To include in one's life of prayer the remembrance of our Lady, to confess one's sins to God *and* "all the company of heaven" including the Mother of our Lord, to sing the praises of the Blessed Mother and to be grateful for her part in the work of our redemption, to feel bound to her—known hardly at all, so far as history goes, but honoured just the same for what she is and did—in the Church which is the Body of her dear Son: here is something so integrally part of one's religion that it is impossible to conceive how bare and cold it would be without it. Above all, to address to her the request, "Pray for us, Holy Mary, that we may be worthy of the benefits of Christ" (as the *Angelus* puts it), does not deny nor minimize the utter supremacy and uniqueness of our Lord and Saviour. It humbly and honestly accepts our human lot and asks that one who (like us) is human, but was exalted to be Mother of that Lord and Saviour, may (in whatever ways God provides) remember our weakness and faithlessness before God's throne and pray to him that (like her) we may become worthy to be used as his instruments in the redemption of the world.

Nor is the veneration of St. Mary without its wider social implications. And to express that, one cannot do better than quote a poem written by one of God's saints in these latter days, the Reverend Frederic Curtiss Lauderburn, for many years the chaplain of the seminary in which the writer teaches. For the poem states superbly the "revolution of the *Magnificat*", which is part of the devotion to the Mother of our Lord, when that devotion is soundly and wholesomely understood:

White-flaming, fiercely pitiful she stands,  
Scimitar lilies in her desperate hands:  
"Come put me down the mighty from their seats,  
Voice of the ages through my voice entreats."  
Our Lady of Reparation,  
Unleash thine indignation.



Under her feet the clean and crescent moon,  
 Sickle of harvest to be garnered soon:  
 "The rich he sends all hungry to their bed,  
 For of his bounty but the poor are fed."  
 Our Lady of Levelling,  
 Forgive our wanton revelling.

Stars shine above the tempest of her brow,  
 A coronet of spears beclouded now:  
 "Scatter the proud before my driving ire,  
 Whirlwind of javelins tipped with pointed fire."  
 Our Lady of Defiance,  
 Bind us in thy alliance.

Seven swords pierce her sacrificial breast,  
 Seven pities of the poor have found their rest:  
 "Exalt the humble to their rightful throne,  
 Where the lonely Christ has climbed the Cross alone."  
 Our Lady of Redress,  
 Share us their humbleness.

A mist of guardian seraphim aflame  
 Shouts *Holy Holy Holy* is his name:  
 "Far on the windy hills of Galilee  
 He that is great hath magnified me."  
 Our Lady of Power,  
 We hail thy coming hour.

Embosomed on a throne of purity  
 She holds a Baby for the world to see:  
 "Lo, for your barter I present my Son . . .  
 Hold your arms out cross-wise, little one."

O Mother of the devastating Christ,  
 We own him King whom, slaves, as Slave we priced.

Clothed in spread beauty from her rainbow dome  
 She yields her Son to us to lead us home:  
 "God hath not yet forgot his primal Word;  
 My soul, my soul doth magnify the Lord."

## IV

A glance through the hymns found in the *New Hymnal* will indicate something of the extent of a "chastened" devotion to the Mother of our Lord. There are songs praising God for "Mary, the pure and

lowly maid, The favored of the Lord". There are the ancient hymns like *Stabat Mater*, with its closing verse:

Jesus, may her deep devotion  
 Stir in me the same emotion,  
     Fount of love, Redeemer kind;  
 That my heart fresh ardour gaining,  
 And a purer love attaining,  
     May with thee acceptance find.

There are the tender carols like "I know a rose-tree springing", in which St. Mary is described as the "spotless maiden, who mothered, for our sake," him who is "true Man, yet very God." There is the hymn by Prudentius, from the fourth century, singing "Of that birth for ever blessed, When the Virgin, full of grace, By the Holy Ghost conceiving, bare the Saviour of our race." Again, there are the direct addresses to the Mother of Christ, in such hymns as "Ye Watchers and Ye Holy Ones", where she is called "higher than the cherubim, more glorious than the seraphim", and "Bearer of the eternal Word, most gracious"; and is asked to "lead the praises" of the faithful as they "magnify the Lord." And there is a peculiarly lovely hymn, "Sing of Mary, pure and lowly", taken from *The Book of Common Praise*.

None of these hymns, nor the others like them, can be called "superstitious"; they bear witness to a deep and tender instinct in the heart of Christian believers, to honour her who was so closely related—by ties of blood, no less—to the incarnate Lord. And when the devotion goes beyond this, and finds expression in simple acts of veneration like the *Angelus*—consisting of several addresses to St. Mary, with a closing collect addressed to God the Father—or some similar bit of practice, the Catholic Christian feels that so long as his theology is right and balanced, he is enabled thereby to enter very genuinely into the great "assembly of the saints in heaven", there to share with them in that participation in God which was granted to men when God deigned to share in our poor humanity.

It is far from the intention of the writer of this paper to endeavour to "convert" his Protestant brethren and friends to his own position. Rather, it is his hope that he may have done a little to explain a central element in Catholic piety, so that his brethren and friends may understand it better and entertain a kindlier attitude towards it.

On his own behalf, he would say that as he wishes to know and appreciate the spiritual riches of those who belong to other communions, so he would wish that they may know and appreciate something very dear to all who are in the Catholic tradition. It is in this way, and in this way only, that we shall come in God's good time to that unity of heart and mind in Christ which will be the token that our Lord's high-priestly prayer has indeed been fulfilled: "that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me."

For those who believe in and practice the veneration of the Blessed Mother of Christ, there is a noble collect, with a paraphrase of which we may fitly conclude our meditation on this theme: that as "by the child-bearing of Blessed Mary" God has "stooped to raise our fallen race, so we who rejoice in her commemoration may at her tender intercession be made partakers of his redemption, who liveth and reigneth with the Father and the Holy Spirit, God world without end. *Amen.*"

## FAITH AND PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY

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In this paper I wish to present an argument to show that something very like faith was required in the Platonic scheme of philosophy in order to cement together the discrete levels of knowledge. There is no doubt that the several levels of knowledge—as presented for instance in the figure of the divided line—<sup>1</sup> tend to become dissociated. Precisely for this reason skepticism is forever hovering in the background of a Platonic philosophy. Plato no less than the Christian Platonists recognized this danger and both completed their rational doctrine with another doctrine: Plato with a myth and the Christian philosophers with faith. I wish to show exactly why the Platonic doctrine of knowledge tends to break and exactly at what point it is rescued by faith. To accomplish this end it will be useful

<sup>1</sup>*Republic* VI. 509-511; cf. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, Cambridge, 1902, II. 62-71.

to review the four Platonic levels of knowledge and point out the difficulty of passing between these levels, especially the difficulty of passing to the highest and most important of these levels. Then after a brief discussion of the doctrine of Recollection, Plato's mythical means of binding these discrete levels together, reference will be made to a Christian doctrine as a means of articulating this scheme of learning.

This undertaking may also throw some light upon Christian philosophy. M. Gilson in his *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* asks whether there is such a thing as Christian philosophy and then indicates that for the mediaeval Platonists "understanding the contents of revelation will be philosophy." But an understanding of the contents of revelation is usually called theology. Hence this statement of M. Gilson appears to identify philosophy with theology. Is this identification necessary? The argument here given will indicate that we shall not be forced to identify the two in spite of the fact that the Christian Platonists, especially St. Augustine, felt it necessary to use a Christian doctrine to rescue Platonic doctrine from a very real and a very serious difficulty.

We may begin by recalling briefly the Platonic doctrine of levels of knowledge. In doing so I wish also to point out the difficulty which endangers the Platonic epistemology.

In *Republic* (bks. VI & VII) Plato brings many of his speculations concerning the learning process together into a theory of learning. In the figure of the divided line he traces learning through four stages: (1) sensory intuition, (2) perception of objects, (3) understanding of concepts, (4) intuition of principles. In learning, the factors elicited on the first level are lifted up to the second and finally to the higher levels by some process of "explanation." In this process whatever it is that is known becomes transformed, for each of the levels has its own characteristics, although we say that the same thing is understood at each level.

These characteristics are familiar enough; nevertheless, it will be well to have an illustration at hand. At the level of sensation one would know a man as a confused bundle of sensations, recalling perhaps Aristotle's description of the child who calls all women mother and all men father. But at the level of opinion one would be able to recognize individual men as such. At the scientific level (or level of hypotheses) one would have the insight to define man with ac-

curacy enough for the science in question, as for instance do the economists or the anthropologists. Finally, though, on reaching the fourth level of the understanding, one should have reached that insight which will enable him to know when and to what extent it is appropriate to assert any of the various theories about man.

Such, then, are the levels of knowledge. The problem which faces anyone interested in questions about learning is how to pass from level to level. How, in other words, does the knowing animal come to know? Theaetetus and Socrates were concerned with this problem. Theaetetus suggested the hypothesis of 'rational explanation' and defined 'rational explanation' as "an orderly approach to the whole through the elements." One may have perception or opinion about the elements (στοιχεῖα), but rational explanation is had only when these elements are united into combinations (συνλάβος). This account appealed to the geometrician, but it quickly became evident that it concealed a paradox. If the elements are not the object of rational knowledge, then a combination of them will be similarly unknown. Here lies the grave difficulty which was suggested above. The whole is the sum of its parts; its intelligibility is no greater than the intelligibility of its parts. The combination m-a-n, to take an illustration, is the three letters: only that and nothing more.

The result is unsatisfactory. Any word is something more than its constituent letters. A new start is made with the supposition that the rational explanation is found in the combination of letters or elements, and here 'combination' means the "single form arising out of the several conjoined elements." In other words, the whole is more than its parts. The parts thus compounded form a new class which manifests properties other than those which the mere addition of the several parts to each other could show.

The elements m-a-n join together to form the combination 'man' which is quite different from the three letters. M-a-n is, in fact, not understood when the letters and syllables are merely noted, for they have an extra-grammatical reference to a certain kind of being in virtue of which the word has a specific value in rhetoric—a value which the individual letters do not have.

Thus we do not yet have a rational account of the whole word. The additional form which converts the assemblage of letters into a word is not present in the mere assemblage of letters. Hence we

<sup>2</sup>Theaetetus 202.

may assume—with Theaetetus—that this new form is something in addition to the original elements. Now if we are to understand this new form on the former analogy, we must analyze it into its elements—the elements of meaning perhaps. But how shall we understand these elements to produce the unit of meaning which is the word 'man'? If the unity of these elements is nothing more than the juxtaposition of these elements, then there is no new meaning. But if this unity is something more than the individual elements, then the elements alone do not compose it; hence they do not explain it. In either case we do not arrive at a rational explanation by putting elements together. Clearly we cannot *reason* from the elements to the meaning of the word which they compose.

This argument may be extended. The letters m-a-n took on a new form—in a way which we noted but could not explain—and made the word 'man', referring to something in nature. 'Man' is the animal which knows how to make arts and sciences. There are, however, many such beings. They form a class in virtue of having the common characteristic just mentioned. But it may be asked how we arrive at knowledge of this defining characteristic. Let us assume that the class is analyzed into the individual men who are its elements or members. As understood thus, it is no more than a collection of individuals. And their unity as a class is not explained merely by noting the members, as the nominalists are never tired of pointing out.

Then, as before, let us assume that the class characteristic is a new form which arises when the elements come together. This new form is the significance of the class which each individual exemplifies as a sign that he is a member; it is the universal. Arguments used in the paragraphs above may be repeated here to show that this new form does not have a rational explanation in terms of elements. Clearly we cannot move by discursive reasoning alone from the individuals composing a class to the universal which they exemplify.

Evidently since m-a-n demands reference to an actual man in order to be understood as more than a mere assemblage of letters, so the class 'man' demands reference to the universal in order to be intelligible as something more than a *flatus vocis*. Our guiding analogy has been: as letters to the meaning, so are particulars to the universal which they signify.

We have made a somewhat rapid transition from the aggregate of



letters m-a-n to the universal 'man.' But this transition was not too rapid to bring into relief the critical point: that the transition was not made by a step-by-step logical procedure. On the contrary we failed entirely to explain how letters come to have reference to a kind of object; similarly we failed to explain how a class of objects embody a common form which constitutes their unity. We merely note these experienced facts.

Two corollaries follow from this conclusion. The first is that since reasoning cannot show how the three letters m-a-n come to refer to the nature 'man', then—since we do refer to 'man'—something extraneous must enter, in order to show how the combination of letters is to be imposed. This extraneous thing is knowledge of what the man is. Having this knowledge as well as a sufficient knowledge of the language, there is no difficulty in imposing the name justly. In other words, semantics is a normative science, the standard for imposing names being insight into the universal, or where this fails, acquaintance with custom. The second corollary to be drawn is that we cannot reason from the near at hand and the immediately obvious—from sensations—to a knowledge about sensations, much less to a knowledge about knowledge. If sensations are said to become in some sense the alphabet of thought, then the reasons for distinguishing and combining them must be admitted to be something other than sensations. Human knowledge is not a continuum of sensations. The lesson of the *Theaetetus* is that human knowledge is discrete. Acquiring skill or knowledge on one level is not a sufficient guarantee that one will thereby acquire insight into the next higher level of knowledge. And we know that the inspiration and insight of one generation of artists and scientists all too easily degenerates to academic routine of a following generation.

It is evident that this aristocratic epistemology is in danger of breaking into its component parts unless some means can be found for binding its discrete levels together. If one cannot mount from level to level by reasoning, by the process of "rational explanation", as *Theaetetus* called it, then how indeed can one learn? The means which Plato chose to explain the learning process and to give his doctrine unity is the very poetic story about recollection. When the question about knowledge comes up in the *Meno*, Socrates remembers that he has heard a myth from certain wise men who told that



as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection.<sup>a</sup>

He interprets the fable by bringing the slave boy to "recollect" the proposition about the square on the diagonal of a square. Then he and Meno turn to the task of eliciting in their own souls the truth about the origin of knowledge. Thus Socrates has gone through four levels: first he vaguely perceived that he remembered something relevant to the question about knowledge, then he made this clear by reciting the fable, thirdly he clarified his meaning as far as possible by recalling exact ratios and proportions in such a way as to lead up to the fourth step, the search for the source of reason. The process in this case is really an effort to understand recollection. It is interesting that Socrates in clarifying his meaning commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent.—If the doctrine of recollection is true, then this ignorant slave boy will recall a theorem in geometry. But the slave boy does recall the theorem in geometry.—The fact that this fallacy is committed sharpens the point which is to be made here. Socrates somehow does certainly make his meaning clear, but it could not have been made clear by his logic, which is fallacious. In other words it is not by logical procedure that one passes from level to level in knowledge. The whole corpus of dialogues is an illustration of this point. Socrates is continually perceiving things far ahead of his audience, then leading them dialectically to see the same thing. But frequently they do not see the same point. Indeed does the dialectic ever reach the same point? Apparently Socrates' intuition leapt ahead in a long straight route and his dialectic, guided by this, followed circling behind never catching up with his intuitions. And this is quite Platonic. A circle drawn in the sand never perfectly embodies the idea. Just so, the intuition seizes an idea which the dialectic never perfectly manifests.

Since recollection and not syllogism is the immediate means by which we may pass from level to level of knowledge, it becomes necessary to reach a better understanding of recollection if we are to know how we learn. Now in the *Meno*, it will be recalled, the quest seems to have been given up, at least the issue was left in the lap

<sup>a</sup>*Meno* 81, tr. Jowett.

of the gods. It will be granted that the doctrine is very difficult to make clear, even with all the mythological machinery added in the *Phaedrus*. . . . Or perhaps all this mythology is *ad hoc*, useful in saving one from misology until a clearer insight is achieved. At any rate the doctrine proved to be a weakness; we are not too surprised by the skeptical turn which the New Academy took.

Plato himself, however, carried his doctrine to the crucial point. The highest recollection of all is the recollection of the idea of the Good, that transcendent source of being as well as of intelligibility, which Plato valiantly strives to clarify in the *Republic*.<sup>4</sup> Elusive though the idea of the Good is, its function at least is clear. An argument which indicates its function runs in this way. No art is complete when taken in isolation but requires at least one higher art to define the end or use for its characteristic product. Thus the military art produces victory. But its victory would be empty, a mere sophistical conquest, were there not a higher art which disposes properly of this victory in the production of the further end: peace. But what is the end of peace? Indeed, what is the end and good of the entire system of arts? Just as the good of any specific product is defined by the next higher art, so the good of the whole system is defined by the Good itself. But the arts do form a system; hence, we infer *that* this Good is relevant to it, although we may not be able to say *what* this Good is. The attempt to say what this idea is, to know its content as it were, ended in failure as the *Charmides* and *Parmenides* show. Nevertheless, the knowledge, that there is such an idea, the source of being and knowledge, is sufficient to order human life and the human arts. . . . At least it appears to be sufficient—within its limits—for effecting this order while men such as Plato or Aristotle were living, men who possessed experience and skill in the dialectic recollection of ideas. But a philosophy with the political and human ambitions of Plato's ought to be able to stand on its own feet with as little aid from mysticism and myth as possible. However, the elusive nature of this highest and most important of all recollections certainly appears to demand a super-human insight. Since this is true, Plato's philosophy becomes at this point all but incommunicable, and thus its political and human ambitions are in practice forever placed beyond it. The philosophy cries out, in fact, for precisely that which the Christian tradition

<sup>4</sup>*Loc. cit.*

sought to add in order to strengthen it at the points where it was forced to fall back upon myth and mysticism.

Now Christianity exchanges myth for faith; it gives content to the idea of the Good and thus articulates the levels of knowledge. A glance at St. Augustine's dialogue, *Concerning the Teacher*, will make this contention evident. Augustine points out, with Plato, that sensations teach us nothing; they merely awaken the interpretative activity of the mind. Sensations which are thus interpreted are a kind of sign. The first part of this dialogue is designed to illustrate the arousing of recollection by means of signs, but the latter part becomes a sign of recollection itself. It arouses a recollection of recollection, the source of knowledge.

Indeed when things are discussed which we perceive through the mind, that is, by means of intellect and reason, these are said to be things which we see immediately in that interior light of truth by virtue of which he himself who is called the interior man is illumined.<sup>8</sup>

Here seems to be the precise point at which Platonism becomes Christian. If it will be recalled that Truth is appropriated to the second person of the Trinity, Augustine's meaning will be perceived.

Accordingly, even though I speak about true things, I still do not teach him who beholds the true things, for he is taught not through my words but my means of the things themselves which God reveals within the soul.<sup>9</sup>

Thus it is not our observation of the signs in nature nor our own logic which produces the truth which we perceive, rather it is the Creator teaching within. St. Augustine, it appears, was quite clear who his intellectual ancestor was, as touching this problem, and how they differed concerning their common difficulty. Augustine writes:

That noble philosopher Plato endeavored to persuade us that the souls of men lived even before they have these bodies; and that hence those things which we learn are rather remembered, as having been known already, than taken into knowledge as things new. . . . But we ought rather to believe that the intellectual mind is so formed in its nature as to see those things,

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<sup>8</sup>*Op. cit.*, Chap. XII. tr. G. G. Leckie.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

which by the disposition of the Creator are subjoined to things intelligible in a natural order, by a sort of incorporeal light of a unique kind, as the eye of the flesh sees things adjacent to itself in this bodily light, of which light it is made to be receptive and adapted to it.<sup>7</sup>

At this point, we come into contact with the source of truth, that "single recollection" from which all the rest follows, of which Socrates spoke. At this point the myth of Recollection passes ever into the Christian virtue of faith, and in this way content is given to the idea of the Good. The Good becomes God. The doctrines of the Trinity, of the trace, of the image, are the keys to the unity discernible in God, the world, and in man. Thus being reveals its unity at all levels, and accordingly knowledge at one stage bears a certain analogy to knowledge at its next stage and awaits only for illumination from the Teacher to pass over to the next stage. In other words, learning becomes illumination, and illumination is the perception of the 'single form' in all things, of the Creator in creation. But this analogy which the different discernible levels of knowledge bear to each other and which serves to bind them together becomes explicit only with the elaboration of the doctrine of the Trinity—though this doctrine is interestingly related to Plato's suggestion that all things are akin, and the intellect is one of those things, one whose nature, however, it is to perceive this universal kinship.

This analogy of all things (including the levels of knowledge) to each other (which perhaps may be regarded as a pre-Thomistic form of the analogy of being) is not fully discerned by the natural powers of the mind and is finally clarified only in the revealed doctrine of the Trinity. But this doctrine is held on faith. Saint Augustine is saying in effect that so (supposedly) familiar a process as coming to know is unintelligible without faith. But 'faith' itself requires clarification; it must be understood in the four senses which have been distinguished. In the first sense faith is the collection of myths and statements which it is conventional to give assent to. In the second sense it is the articulated creed and becomes consciously held as the evidence of things unseen which it seeks to understand. In the third sense faith does achieve a degree of understanding, at least to the extent that it becomes illuminated by a coherent theory

<sup>7</sup>*De Trinitate*, XII, 15.

and hence is more secure and more easily defensible. But faith seen through a glass darkly, in the stages just mentioned, is seen directly at the last stage, and in this sense it becomes identical with revelation. This is the immediate vision of Truth revealed as the ground and goal of the process whose several stages we have described. Thus faith is finally revelation, and revelation is illumination by Truth. Faith and understanding ultimately are identical. The place of the myth of Recollection, which held the discernible stages in the learning process together, like beads strung on a gossamer, is taken by faith which is made in the individual who learns by the same hand which made the universe. Only on reaching this point where it is seen that the source of both knowledge and the objects of knowledge are identical is there found any certainty that we do learn what we appear to learn.

This explanation of the meaning of faith should not be taken to imply that there are four kinds of faith. Faith is the same for all. But we are faced with several levels of the understanding of faith.\*

The conclusion to our argument is that man does not save himself—epistemologically speaking. The gap discussed above is bridged by the Teacher within. Truth as perceived by man is something made within him by the same power which created all beings. Thus knowledge is a product of the art of Wisdom. And philosophy is a part of this knowledge whose function is to know its source, the credentials of its truth. The point is that philosophy would not know itself with any certainty were it not that Faith had supervened to identify this source with a force and clarity quite wanting in the myth of Recollection. Now it is hard to see how a philosophy unable to identify its own source of illumination could long maintain its best and most difficult insights at the requisite level of clarity. But it must preserve these insights in order to maintain itself against a destructive Sophistry. Faith, then, as that intellectual virtue which—among other things—enables philosophy to know and maintain itself, would appear to be the essential part of philosophy. It is in this sense that the dictum of M. Gilson cited at the beginning of this paper is to be understood. The theological doctrine does not replace but completes and secures the philosophical doctrine. Within

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\*It ought to be added that M. Gilson is of the opinion that St. Augustine departed from this view in his later writings. Cf. *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, N. Y., 1938, note 1 to Chap. III, p. 108. Cf. also St. Augustine, *De Lib. Arbitrio*, II, 2, 6.

this Christianized context philosophy becomes the handmaid of Faith. Philosophy finds its freedom, for therein the philosopher is illuminated by the source of truth.

With this transition philosophic wisdom becomes Christian wisdom. It is just this tradition, of course, to which many modern philosophers would object, largely on the ground that it represents an attempt to solve philosophical problems by non-philosophical means, to shift without warrant human problems onto the Deity. But if the contention of this paper is correct, our problem can scarcely be said to be solvable by rational means alone—at least within a Platonist context. Plato himself seems to say as much. In his effort to answer the Sophistic thesis, that man is the measure of all things, he constructed his theory of ideas. The difficulty is that this theory entails lacunas such as that between the eternal ideas and the temporal actualities which somehow approximate to the ideas. These splits may be illuminated but not explained by such myths as the myth of Recollection. It is certain that Plato recognized this difficulty as well as the danger of an infertile skepticism which might follow upon it. Doubtless he had this brand of skepticism in mind when he wrote "Now, God ought to be the measure of all things, and not man."<sup>9</sup> We may take St. Augustine's contribution to the Platonic Philosophy as the elaboration of the suggestion which Plato himself initiated. No doubt, therefore, Plato would agree in this judgment of his philosophy: that it is in danger of falling prey to skepticism, from which it can be rescued only by Grace.

<sup>9</sup>*Laws*, IV, 716, tr. Jowett.

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## MAHAYANA CHRISTIANITY

By WALTER LOWRIE

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The transformation of genuine Buddhism into the degenerate form which boasts of being The Greater Vehicle (Mahayana) is a warning which all religions should take to heart, for it represents a temptation from which none of them is free.

The word "baskets" (*pitakas*) is used picturesquely to describe the three parts into which the Buddhist Scriptures are divided, and "vehicle" is used no less picturesquely to describe the Doctrine which carries a man on the way to Enlightenment and Perfection. "The Lesser Vehicle" (Hinayana) is the term invented by progressive Buddhists to disparage the simple and primitive doctrine still held by conservative schools, and it is cheerfully accepted by the conservatives because it indicates aptly the position of those who base their faith exclusively upon the Scriptures and the authentic traditions. This distinction between the Greater and the Lesser Vehicle plainly reflects the difference between Catholic and Protestant; and if Protestants were denounced only for clinging to the Lesser Vehicle, they would have no reason for resentment.

Buddhism in its primitive and severest form had a remarkable success in India, in spite of the rigid logic which denied the existence of gods, the substance of the soul, and the pertinence of sacrifices, which even did away with caste and humbled the Brahmins. Although the Doctrine was preached to every man, it was not available to all, but only to such as were able and willing to live as monks. In order to become a catholic religion, Buddhism gradually adopted the practices and beliefs of the common people, and out of these elements it constructed the Greater Vehicle, an omnibus capacious enough to carry all men for some distance along the path to Perfection. These tactics were at first successful in the highest degree: Buddhism became the predominant religion of India—but it is ominous to reflect that eventually (eight centuries ago) it vanished completely from the Indian peninsula.

Except in Ceylon and Burma, where there was no indigenous cul-



ture either secular or religious, the zealous propaganda which carried Buddhism far beyond the borders of India was characterized by amalgamations even more complete and was rewarded by more permanent success. In China, where Buddhism arrived just before the Christian era, and where it began to flourish in the fourth century, the Doctrine encountered a high civilization which it could not displace and therefore absorbed. It could make no peace with Confucianism, but it became so thoroughly amalgamated with Taoism that it was hardly distinguishable from it. It suffered the same fate in Japan, where it was introduced by Korean missionaries in the sixth century and soon amalgamated with Shintoism. These two countries present the classical example of Mahayana Buddhism. In Tibet, where the Doctrine was introduced later, it was denatured by a still more fantastic development, which eventually included the claim to temporal power. The Greater Vehicle was so tolerant of foreign religions that even in Tibet it adopted some Christian ideas, still more in China, where this religion was made known by the Nestorian Church in the fourth century as well as by the Dominican mission in the fourteenth, and in Japan, where the Jesuits had a great success in the sixteenth.

The Greater Vehicle is an appropriate name for the type of Buddhism which now can claim to be catholic in most parts of Asia except the land of its birth. But as against the adherents of the Lesser Vehicle, who in Ceylon and Burma have displayed an amazing resistance to change, this proud title can be defended only by the improbable allegation that the conspicuous additions which make the vehicle "great," though they are not sanctioned by the Scriptures or by the authentic Tradition, represent what Buddha would have taught his disciples, if they had been able to bear it.

The Mahayana development of Buddhism is not only a wholesome warning but an instructive analogy. No religion has wholly escaped the danger of changing its color, like the chameleon, to match its environment. In Christendom the most obvious instance is Post-Tridentine Catholicism, the Catholicism of the Counter Reformation, which is most clearly expressed by the Jesuits. The zealous missionaries of this order who went to Japan in the sixteenth century attained extraordinary success by adopting the practices and beliefs of the religion they sought to suppress. For this they were recalled by the Pope, and their order was for a time suppressed. It could not be permanently suppressed, because the Church of Rome was

then committed to the principle of the Greater Vehicle. Protestants have reason to envy the success it has attained by such methods. But the foundations are precarious. For the Christian Scriptures (which are far more reliable than those of the Buddhists), and even the early traditions, give no countenance to the embellishments which make the vehicle great.

Lately when I was writing a review of Thomas Merton's popular book, *The Seven Storey Mountain*, which gives an account of his conversion to Catholicism and his adoption of the life of a Trappist monk, I was dismayed at the evidence he gives of the prevalence of what I would call a Baroque or Rococo type of Catholicism. For among the Catholics with whom I have lived on intimate terms I have observed no tendency to Mahayana but rather a reversion to the doctrine and the piety of the Fathers.

It was Harnack's notion that early Catholicism was distinguished from primitive Christianity by its adoption of Greek ways of thinking which naturally resulted from the use of that language. But if this meant an essential transformation of Christianity, it is enshrined in the Greek New Testament, the Lesser Vehicle which Protestants as well as Catholics accept, and behind that one cannot securely go. At all events, there is no trace here of the Greater Vehicle.

In my opinion, Protestantism, for fear of being led too far, does not make enough of early traditions, which illuminate the New Testament, even though they are not reported by it. They properly belong to the Lesser Vehicle, which only in terms of an extravagant comparison is "lesser" and ought not to be regarded as *little*. But I am fearful of the Greater Vehicle because I discern in Anglo-Catholicism a tendency to flirt with it. For my part, I do not protest against being called a Catholic, because in fact I am disposed to return to the sobriety of the Fathers as the only possible way of escaping the conflict between Catholic and Protestant which has equally deformed both these high contending parties, and as the only hopeful way of attaining some degree of conformity in doctrine and worship. But what I have in mind is a Catholicism very far removed from the type I have just stigmatized as Baroque or Rococo and now call Mahayana, the Catholicism of the Greater Vehicle. Against this my prejudice is so strong that I shrink from every indication of it, such as the use of Baroque architecture for Churches, a fondness for short lace surplices, or even so trivial a thing as the biretta—I mean

the three horned biretta (the *tricorno*, as the Italians call it), which in Italy is worn by parochial priests and sacristans (hardly a distinguished category), and is not worn by monks, neither by bishops, nor by cardinals, nor by the Pope. There is reason to suspect that the *tricorno* on the head of an Anglican clergyman indicates a romantic sacramentalism and a sneaking partiality for the Greater Vehicle.

The analogy of Mahayana Buddhism suggests that the method it adopts to promote the broadest possible diffusion weakens its fibre. In China and Japan it appears to be disintegrating, and it is yet to be seen whether it is the sort of religion which is strong enough to endure persecution. One cannot be blind to the fact that Mahayana Catholicism has lost most of its adherents even in western Europe. It seems strong only in North America, and there partly in comparison with the weakness of Protestantism, whether divided or united. In spite of my zeal for Church unity, I cannot ignore ominous signs that union means weakness when it is achieved by a smug contentment with the greatest common denominator, which involves reducing the Lesser Vehicle to the smallest proportions. In Christendom the Lesser Vehicle has always been smaller than it ought to be because of the astringent effect of protest. On the other hand, the Protestant protest has prompted Roman Catholicism, the Greater Vehicle, to a perilous degree of over-extension. It must retreat, if it can to earlier positions, perhaps to its origins; and if Protestantism goes back to the origins, without halting doggedly at its Protestant origins, the Greater and the Lesser Vehicles will find themselves at least within hailing distance, and the Lesser Vehicle (if it does not reject the tradition which throws light upon the Scripture) will prove large enough to carry—not perhaps the many who are called but the few who are chosen.

## "GOD WAS IN CHRIST"

By SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

Episcopal Theological School

*God Was In Christ: An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement.* By D. M. Baillie.  
New York: Scribner, 1948, pp. 213. \$2.75.

In the two years that have passed since its publication, Professor Baillie's book has been widely acclaimed. Written with verve, readable, penetrating and deeply religious, it describes admirably the present situation in Christological thought, and it will not soon go out of date. *God Was In Christ* has been criticized because it does not set forth a complete doctrine of the Incarnation and the Atonement, but Baillie does not profess to do this. He has written an excellent preface to further constructive work on these doctrines, laying down new lines of thought that can be worked out further. The book should be a good catalyst for theological thinking.

Baillie begins by showing that docetism in Christology is dead and only awaits a deep burial—the humanity of our Lord is now generally taken seriously—while the other important fact in the present situation is that the "new historical radicalism" has put an end to the liberal historicism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The paradox is that some of the most sceptical New Testament scholars hold a high Christology on dogmatic grounds, while taking no interest in "the personality of Jesus." To the question whether we can really do without "the Jesus of history," Baillie answers that we cannot and need not. He accepts the argument of C. H. Dodd that it is possible to know the important facts about Jesus as an historical person. Thus we are not left with a redeemer-myth and little else.

Then follows a chapter entitled "Why a Christology?" in which Baillie maintains that without Christology it is impossible to have a satisfactory doctrine of God or to make sense out of history. The chapter closes with a brief statement of what the Incarnation is not, illustrated by the classic heresies. In the fourth chapter, "Critique of Christologies," Baillie rejects theories of *anhypostasia* as leading to Apollinarianism (Relton's theory is the least open to objection)

and the Kenotic theory as separating the persons of the Trinity and destroying the doctrine of the permanence of Christ's manhood. Karl Heim's interpretation in terms of leadership and lordship, the third modern type of Christology, does not touch the Christological problem at all.

The heart of the book is in Chapters V and VI, "The Paradox of the Incarnation" and "The Incarnation and the Trinity." Christian faith inevitably involves paradoxes or antinomies. The doctrines of creation and providence are examples of this, and the supreme paradox, the doctrine of grace, points beyond itself to the Incarnation. "In the New Testament we see the man in whom God was incarnate surpassing all other men in refusing to claim anything for Himself independently and ascribing all the goodness to God. We see Him also desiring to take up other men into His own close union with God, that they might be as He was. And if these men, entering some small measure through Him into that union, experience the paradox of grace for themselves in fragmentary ways, and are constrained to say, 'It was not I but God', may not this be a clue to the understanding of that perfect life in which the paradox is complete and absolute, that life of Jesus which, being the perfection of humanity, is also, and even in a deeper and prior sense, the very life of God Himself?" (p. 117). Baillie goes on to work out this point, remarking that the God who was incarnate must be understood in terms of the God revealed in the Incarnation, rather than by any preconceived notion of deity which we may possess.

From these questions we are led directly into the problem of the Trinity. As in Christological thought, so here there are inevitably two divergent trends—the Sabellian direction (illustrated by Karl Barth's idea of three "modes of being" in God) and the tendency of Anglican theologians to think of the persons of the Trinity as distinct personal beings between whom there can be a "social" relationship. Baillie believes that the way out is through a synthesis between two approaches to the uniqueness of Christianity: its unique revelation of the "character" of God and its new trinitarian concept. "The two are not really divergent but convergent and ultimately identical" (p. 144). In working this out Baillie shows that early Christian experience made the Trinity formula necessary, but he suggests no philosophical synthesis between "modes" and "persons" (pp. 144-47). Paradox alone expresses the full truth; on the one hand, we must

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say that the Incarnation occurred "because here at last a Man was perfectly receptive," while at the same time "the divine is always prevenient" (pp. 149 f.). The concluding part of Chapter VI defends the doctrine that Christ's humanity is permanently joined with his divinity. This, and the doctrine of the Trinity, are necessary to explain and safeguard the continuing experience of union with Jesus Christ, an experience as real as that which was vouchsafed the first disciples. Baillie speaks appreciatively of the emphasis of Leonard Hodgson and Charles W. Lowry on the necessity of trinitarian doctrine for Christian devotion. "The Trinitarian approach to God must always be important for Christian worship, as a safeguard against our worshipping an idol of our imaginations instead of the true God" (p. 155).

Philosophical theologians will not be able to let the question rest here. We might remark that perhaps the right way to work out a Christian philosophy would be to begin with the antinomies of faith to which Baillie has called attention. Unless they are kept clearly in the foreground, some aspect of truth will be neglected and the system brought to shipwreck. One need not be a Barthian to see that one reason for the ancient difficulty of fitting dogma into philosophy is that the only philosophy that can express the Christian faith is one which expresses the biblical perspective on life. The Bible has an unexpressed and unsystematic philosophy all its own.

Chapter VII asks "Why the Atonement?" Here the antinomy is that the Bible contains two strands of thought: the free and abundant pardon of God and the need of costly atonement. The answer is that "the expiation is made in the heart and life of God Himself" (p. 178). Chapter VIII deals with the relation of this to the Cross and the necessity of a synthesis between the subjective and objective sides of the Atonement. The final chapter is an epilogue on "The Body of Christ." The distinctive mark of the new People of God, which is the nucleus of a new humanity, is that it is a society of sinners forgiven, every member of which confesses "Not I, but the grace of God."

This reviewer is not a theologian, and his further remarks have to do only with certain points which touch on biblical studies.

Most students and parsons find themselves baffled by the skepticism of some New Testament critics with regard to the "historical Jesus" (Baillie, pp. 22, 27, 39, gives Bultmann and R. H. Lightfoot as ex-

amples of this). Some scholars may be made more sceptical, or impelled to state their negative conclusions in extreme form, precisely by their apologetic interest. They are perhaps more reserved in their judgments than they would be if they were dealing with issues of less fundamental importance. Knowing, as they do, how difficult it is to nail down any particular incident or saying of Jesus as historical fact, they wish to establish Christian theology on some absolute foundation, not on anything which can be attacked as no more than historically probable. Thus Bultmann founds his theology on the Pauline faith interpreted in the light of existential philosophy.

Surely no one can desire that any historical student will be less than rigorously honest. At the same time, Baillie is right in pointing out that the opinions of Bultmann and Lightfoot are not universally shared by people who use similar methods. He cites Dodd's work as one example (pp. 57 f.). Probably no one writing in English has stated the situation more clearly than the late Burton Scott Easton in *The Gospel before the Gospels*. While the gospels are not stenographic reports or eyewitness accounts written down immediately and transmitted without change, and therefore it is difficult to say that any particular incident in the gospels occurred *exactly as narrated*, many items are faithful examples of the kind of thing Jesus said and did, and therefore it is possible to get from the gospels a reliable insight into his human character and activity.

All biographers and historians know what a difficult art it is to interpret *any* historical character. It is simply a question of degree; there are important persons in history for whom the sources are richer, others for whom they are more scanty, than our sources for the life of Jesus. When it is said, as so often it is today, that "a biography of Jesus cannot be written," it means that we do not have sources for the kind of story we would like to write of the life of most historical figures, even though—as I believe—we can sketch out some of the most significant facts about his life and character. While we cannot satisfy our curiosity, we can know him well enough historically to be his friends and servants and learn from him the whole duty of man.

Dodd gives Jesus' friendliness to publicans and sinners as an example of these historical facts. Baillie is right in saying that one of the most significant facts about Jesus' attitude was his lack of concern for his own glory and his own place in the scheme of things,

and his desire for the glory of God alone (see especially pp. 125-27). But there are a number of other data which significantly reveal Jesus' concrete interests. He hated self-righteousness. He insisted that every man must face the question of his own standing before God, regardless of the merits or demerits of others. Without weakening the moral demands of the Law, he taught that God's grace is sovereign and free; God can and does treat man according to his own generosity, not according to what man thinks is appropriate. His attitude toward the political and religious issues of the first century was curiously detached, because the Kingdom of God (i.e. God's loving sovereignty) stood in judgment over all the schemes and constructions of men. Religion itself, as it was generally understood, was under this same judgment. It is impossible to fit our Lord completely into the scheme of any party or group—Pharisee, Sadducee, zealot, or even Pauline Christian!—because his perspective is always a little different. He always asks, not what is best for the world, or expedient for human relations, but what God's attitude is. This leads him into conclusions that moralists have often considered arbitrary and dangerous; the New Testament and other early Christian writings furnish examples of attempts to domesticate our Lord's teaching and soften its scandals.

This is the answer to the curious remark of Karl Barth quoted by Baillie (p. 17) that Jesus is "apt to impress us as a little commonplace alongside more than one other founder of a religion or even alongside many later representatives of His own religion." Such a thing might be said of the smoothed-out and systematized teaching of Jesus presented in some books of theology and devotion or some of the liberal "lives," but it hardly applies to the parables, which are our best sources. It is true that Jesus' perspective is to some degree discernible in the prophets and that most of his specific teachings are paralleled in the rabbis. Even the idea that God takes the initiative in seeking the lost sinner, which Montefiore finds unique (cf. Baillie, p. 63), is at least foreshadowed in Hosea. But none of his predecessors and followers quite shook off the moralism that explained life as a series of rewards and punishments for behavior—Job is almost the only exception—and none kept the sovereignty and activity of God so constantly in the forefront of his thinking. And, finally, much of the uniqueness of Jesus consists in

what he selects out of the rich tradition of his people and the startling turn he gives to old ideas.

I should not wish to minimize the importance of that side of Christological thinking which deals with the whole question of Jesus' nature and essence. But I should like to emphasize the point made by Baillie (pp. 118-32) that, if we take the Incarnation seriously, certain aspects of Jesus' teaching and behavior constitute the most concrete and specific revelation of God that we possess. This means, for example, that God became incarnate in order to put an end to self-righteousness and self-satisfaction and to put man's relationship with himself on a new basis which can be variously described as that of the Kingdom of God, the family of God, or the grace-faith relation. It also means that God himself is quite unconcerned for his own glory, or rather that his supremest glory is his grace. He is glorified most truly when he is loved by forgiven sinners.

Finally, we should be careful not to make a false distinction between Jesus' teaching and the other aspects of his work of redemption. Through his teaching and healing, in the days of his flesh, he produced that effect on man which is also produced when a man is "in Christ" and is joined to him in his Cross and Resurrection. Nor is his teaching something distinct from his nature. His words, as found in the synoptic gospels, are part of his saving activity, and his saving activity is part of his nature. It is not merely revelation of the character of God, if by revelation we mean "A telling B something about C;" it is God himself uttering his word, which will not return to him void, but will accomplish the thing whereunto he has sent it.

## HOOKE ON AUTHORITY

By RICHARD H. WILMER, JR.

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Possibly the most difficult problem of the whole 16th century reformation was the matter of authority. Rupert Davies, in an excellent little book<sup>1</sup> has shown us how desperately Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin struggled with the question, and how each came to his own distinctive and discrete solution. When the word from Rome needed no longer to be equated with the Word of God, by what standard of religious authority were men to act? And of this standard, who was to be the interpreter?

The 16th century attempted many solutions to the problem. At one extreme there was the Tridentine proposition that there are two independent and equally valid sources of authority: the holy Scriptures (including the Apocrypha), and the unwritten traditions of the Church.<sup>2</sup> To the non-Romanist, this independence of the two sources implied the victory of the papacy and the defeat of the Bible. To him there was always the threat that Rome would move without scriptural warrant, and that the things that be of man would displace the things that be of God.

At the other pole, there were those fanatics of Central Europe, Spirit-illuminationists, who needed no support from Scripture nor hierarchy but only inner guidance to act with final assurance.<sup>3</sup> Between these extremes, the various other syntheses ranged themselves, depending more or less strongly on the Scripture text for ultimate authority, and on the inner witness of the Holy Spirit to confirm the believer in his Bible faith.

By the time Richard Hooker began his treatise *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, the Church of England had clearly defined her stand on Scripture and the Church. In the *Articles of Religion* she had said:

"Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to



salvation. In the name of the Holy Scripture we do understand those canonical Books of the Old and New Testament, of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church."<sup>4</sup>

Rejecting any Roman idea of two distinct grounds of authoritative doctrine, the article equally denied the anti-scriptural claims of the Spirit-illuminationists. Still, who was to be the interpreter of scripture? Not the individual for himself, not the local congregation only. The Church was to discharge this task, and cautious safeguards were set:

The Church hath power to decree Rites or Ceremonies, and authority in Controversies of Faith: and yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to God's Word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another. Wherefore, although the Church be a witness and a keeper of Holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree any thing against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce any thing to be believed for necessity of salvation."<sup>5</sup>

But the Puritans could not agree. They held that to give the Church even such a guardian role as this was to exalt unwarrantedly the visible institution at the expense of the Eternal Word. Convinced Calvinists, they regarded themselves faithful members of the Church of England who sought to bring the national Church from its halfway house of anti-Roman reform into the pure Genevan atmosphere. As Calvinists, they believed that the Bible was quite self-authenticating, and that the Holy Spirit confirmed true Scriptural faith in believers' hearts.<sup>6</sup> Surely, they argued, no external interpreter was needed for the Bible. Furthermore, what grounds did the Church have to set up rites and ceremonies for which no explicit Scriptural directions were given? To the followers of Geneva, the English Church seemed in desperate danger. Here was a partially reformed church, drifting into treacherous, uncharted seas. As far as the Puritans were concerned, the Bible, and the Bible only was the one guide that could save the church.

But Anglicanism has always eschewed the "one sure thing" approach. Its rich blend of catholicism, protestantism, and humanism is nothing new. This synthesis assures the Anglican that God's ways to man are not limited for their expression to a single Book, however holy, but may also be apprehended through the lessons of his-

toric continuity and through the use of the rational, scholarly-critical process. *Le bon Dieu* may be seen from many angles.

As a matter of fact, the very thing that lifted Hooker's work above the other controversial writings of the period was his doctrine of God. Hooker did not believe in a God who had simply given His Word to man in a closed deposit of the faith, and had then left man with nothing but that single Book to guide him in every aspect of life. Throughout his work Hooker was concerned with showing his reader the kind of a God who reveals Himself in many ways. He recognized the appeal of the powerful, single-minded insistence on Scripture only, but he also realized that Puritanism had rested its case on the assumption that the Scriptures are the only law by which man must act in his relation to God, and that therefore they must stand as the sole principle of authority. Far from denying the authority of Scriptures, Hooker sought to set the Bible in its proper context of the whole divine economy. Therefore in Book I he took issue with the Puritans, on the ground that they had limited *Law* to the explicit word of the Scriptures, and precluded the possibility of any other law's being eternally valid and binding.

The Reformation insistence on human corruption and the absolute sovereignty of God had tended to make men less and less trustful of human reason. It had driven its supporters to accept the Bible as the absolute Will of God committed to an absolute and final Scriptural revelation. Reason was not to be regarded as a trustworthy guide; obedience to Scripture without question was man's only hope. But Hooker believed in reason. He held that Scripture was not a divine cure-all, to be ripped out of its historical context and unilaterally applied as an absolute remedy. Rather, it must be interpreted by human reason wherever appropriate to human situations. Suppose a situation arose which was not covered by Scripture. There men must decide. Again, suppose the situation were covered by Scripture, but only in such a way that an interpretation of a particular scriptural principle or passage was made necessary. There again men must decide. What men have decided down through history is of immense importance, and a *sine qua non* to be considered is the extent and force of *human* authority. Hooker was not going to enter the struggle with the Puritans and limit himself to a discussion of the "Divine Law" alone—to him the Natural Law, the human law (of several sorts), and the "Divine Law" all had their

appropriate claims on man, and God's universal action could not be locked up in the Scriptures. It was not until he had thoroughly analyzed the nature of Law that Hooker began to defend the Anglican doctrine of authority.

Thus, the First Book actually becomes a treatise on Law. By showing the many kinds of laws operative among men, Hooker laid the ground-work on which he was to erect his defence. At the same time, the Puritan view that Scripture directs man's wisdom in all things was challenged as untrue and narrow.<sup>7</sup> There are many kinds of law—natural, rational, supernatural, political, ecclesiastical. There are laws for animals, laws for angels, laws for men. Surely it would be wrong to think of the Scriptures as a complete and final draft of God's omniscient Law Book. Having built his case for human reason, not *qua* the individual, corrupt man, but *qua* universal consensus inspired by God down through the ages, he writes (with a side glance at Scripture):

"The general and perpetual voice of men is as the sentence of God Himself. For that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught; and God being the author of Nature, her voice is but His instrument."<sup>8</sup>

But Hooker rarely delivered himself of a major argument without reinforcing it with Scriptural testimony. Even as he appealed to man to allow the law of reason to help be his ethical guide, he supported his teaching with three canonically scriptural warrants.<sup>9</sup>

Having begun his work by showing his different and wider approach to Law, Hooker came next to face the Puritans over the specific issue of the "Divine Law." He took pains to point out that there are spheres in which God has not actually dictated precise procedures. Politics, for example, is one of these spheres. Furthermore, even in the particular spheres where God has spoken, He has not always spoken immutably. In matters of non-essentials even God's law is mutable,<sup>10</sup> and the key question which one must always ask is, "*Why* was this law instituted?" Laws, both human and divine, may be altered so that the end and matter for which they were made can be attained the more readily. One must not follow Scripture blindly—one must use one's reason, see *why* God instituted such and such a law, and try to cooperate with the purpose of God by changing the letter of the law if it no longer serves its divine purpose ade-

quately. The Scripture teaches what is necessary, but it leaves a number of things free to be ordered at the discretion of the Church, just as nature leaves it to man to choose his own attire."<sup>11</sup>

This does not mean that Hooker teaches a low doctrine of the Bible. The Scriptures are "with such absolute perfection framed, that in them there neither wanteth anything the lack whereof might deprive us of life, nor anything in such wise aboundeth, that as being superfluous . . . we should think it no loss or danger at all if we should want it."<sup>12</sup>

Scripture contains all those things necessary to salvation which could not be known otherwise;<sup>13</sup> its revelation is the partner and complement of the natural revelation, for "the unsufficiency of the light of Nature is by the light of Scripture so fully and so perfectly herein supplied, that further light than this hath added there doth not need unto that end."<sup>14</sup>

However, if it is maintained that Scripture comprehends all things lawful to be done, the result is the abrogation of the law of nature. Instead of retaining its proper place in the scheme of authority, the Bible would then become not a light on the way to salvation, but a "snare and a torment to weak consciences, filling them with infinite perplexities . . . and extreme despairs."<sup>15</sup>

"Two opinions therefore there are concerning sufficiency of Holy Scripture, each extremely opposite unto the other, and both repugnant unto truth. The schools of Rome teach Scripture to be so unsufficient as if, except traditions were added, it did not contain all revealed and supernatural truth, which absolutely is necessary for the children of men in this life to know that they may in the next be saved. Others justly condemning this opinion grow likewise unto a dangerous extremity, as if Scripture did not only contain all things in that kind necessary, but all things simply, and in such sort that to do anything according to any other law were not only unnecessary but even opposite unto salvation, unlawful and sinful."<sup>16</sup>

The fact that Scripture leaves certain things to be settled by the Church's discretion in no way impairs the honor which the Church yields to the perfection of Scripture.<sup>17</sup> Nor did Hooker add reason as a supplement to any defect in the Scriptures, but rather as a necessary instrument without which man could not reap the benefit of Scripture's perfection.<sup>18</sup> For example, we could not even know that it

is Scripture which contains the sacred authority on which our faith and salvation depend, if it were not for our reason. Where it is held that we could not hold the scriptural faith except for the gift of the Spirit, this does not exclude the function of reason—it simply means that reason needs the guidance of the Spirit.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, Hooker judiciously inserted a warning to the religious left-wing not to pervert the function of the Spirit in matters of authority and interpretation, “lest men think that the Spirit of God doth testify those things which the Spirit of error suggesteth”.<sup>20</sup> Although the Spirit leads us unto all truth, His workings are so secret that we are on sounder ground when we gather by reason from the quality of things done or believed in that the Spirit has directed us in both, rather than to settle ourselves to believe or do anything as moved thereto by the Spirit.

But what Hooker feared even more in this whole issue was that an unintelligent, uncritical acceptance of the principle of *scriptura sola* in questions of authority might lead men to throw away reason, moderation, and the experience of all history, thus inviting the very destruction of the faith. “Exclude the use of natural reasoning about the sense of Holy Scripture concerning the articles of our faith, and then that the Scripture doth concern the articles of our faith who can assure us?”<sup>21</sup>

Thus Richard Hooker expounded his doctrine of authority. Despite the protests of the Puritans, he persisted in making the same distinction as Whitgift had done between *things essential* and *things accessory*.<sup>22</sup> Hooker held that the Church has no authority to change the doctrine revealed by Scripture, but every right to “make canons, laws, and decrees, even as we read that in the Apostles’ time it did”, in matters belonging “to discipline and outward polity”.<sup>23</sup> He maintained throughout that the Bible is the supreme source of authority in that it is the locus of the doctrine of salvation, but he strongly upheld the authority of human reason, as crystallized by divine action in the consensus of the Church, to judge in matters of controversy and to devise rites and ceremonies, provided no positive law of Scripture were broken.<sup>24</sup> Not only did he mourn the fact that the Puritans seemed to have limited the divine economy to the pages of Scripture; they had further erred in neglecting the importance of human rational faculties and historic continuity. They had not distinguished between what the Scriptures, in their authority, validly cover, and what is outside their province. They had failed to understand the end of

laws, for they denied that God's laws in things accessory are mutable. Against a background of God instructing His Church in the right use of its legislative and judicial faculties, and conferring on His people the priceless gifts of Scripture, reason, and tradition, Hooker etched the lines of a Puritanism which had erred into the principle of *scriptura sola*, precisely because it had never properly understood the breadth of God's ways to man.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>*The Problem of Authority in the Continental Reformers*. London: Epworth Press, 1946.

<sup>2</sup>Council of Trent, Fourth Session, *Decree concerning the Canonical Scriptures*. For the original text and the English translation, *vide Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, ed. H. J. Schroeder, O. P. London and St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1941, pp. 296-297 and 17-18 respectively.

<sup>3</sup>For an analysis of *Spiritualismus* in this period, *vide* Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*. Eng. trans., London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1949, vol. I, pp. 738ff.

<sup>4</sup>Article VI.

<sup>5</sup>Article X.

<sup>6</sup>*Vide* John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, I, VII, 5.

<sup>7</sup>Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, II, I, 4ff.

<sup>8</sup>*ibid.*, I, VIII, 3.

<sup>9</sup>*ibid.*, I, VIII, 11. He cites *Psalm* 135:18, *Psalm* 4:17-18, and *Isaiah* 44:18-19. In addition, Hooker also cites two Apocryphal passages, *Wisdom* 13:17 and 14:15-16.

<sup>10</sup>*ibid.*, III, III, 3.

<sup>11</sup>*ibid.*, III, IV.

<sup>12</sup>*ibid.*, I, XIII, 3.

<sup>13</sup>*ibid.*, I, XIV, 5.

<sup>14</sup>*ibid.*, II, VIII, 3.

<sup>15</sup>*ibid.*, II, VIII, 6.

<sup>16</sup>*ibid.*, II, VIII, 7.

<sup>17</sup>*ibid.*, III, IV.

<sup>18</sup>*ibid.*, III, VIII, 10.

<sup>19</sup>*ibid.*, III, VIII, 15.

<sup>20</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>*ibid.*, III, VIII, 16.

<sup>22</sup>John Whitgift, *Works* Cambridge: Parker Society, 1851-3. Vol. I, pp. 175ff.

<sup>23</sup>Hooker, *op. cit.*, III, X, 6.

<sup>24</sup>*ibid.*, III, IX, 2; *cf.* III, XI, 13.



## BOOK REVIEWS

*Chapters in a Life of Paul.* By John Knox. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950, pp. 168. \$2.50.

The 1949 Quillian Lectures delivered at Emory University have been expanded by the lecturer and certain material already set forth by him included to make a new and exceptionally comprehensible addition to the study of one of the most perplexing figures in Christian history.

The author is not attempting an exhaustive biography of the Apostle, but is rather concerned with the introductory problems which confront anyone undertaking such a life history.

The study is divided into three parts; an analysis of the sources which are available and an evaluation of their relative usefulness constitutes the first part. In this section Dr. Knox differentiates between the data afforded by the Pauline Epistles and those of the Acts. In spite of his contention that the Acts has historical value he definitely establishes the superiority of the Epistles as the source for most dependable facts in the life of the Apostle.

The second part is on "The Career of the Apostle" and deals with the Epistles and Acts. These two chapters are characterized by logical and convincing argument and set up in concise outline the crucial problems of divergence between the sources. It is at this point that the author declares, "The whole answer to the question whether an inclusive and coherent, even if quite summary, pattern of the length and course of Paul's career as an apostle can be gathered from the letters alone depends upon whether this objection [viz., that Paul might have been silent about journeys to Jerusalem in addition to the three he mentions] is sound." Dr. Knox is certain that "Paul's language" can be interpreted to mean "not simply three visits but three visits only." He makes this point of the Jerusalem visits of considerable importance in his study of the Epistles and the Acts.

In his chapter on "Places and Dates" we come upon a chronology which the author has already set forth in two articles, in the *Journal of Religion* (XVI. 341ff.) and the *Journal of Biblical Literature* (LVIII. 15ff.). This tempting chronology is based upon an interpreta-

tion of the fourteen so called "silent" years which does not hamper him in the same way as Kirsopp Lake was hamstrung by his theory, and it results in a chronology which is freer of assumptions than any proposed to date.

With a masterful chapter, "The Man and His Work," Dr. Knox concludes the second part. In this chapter almost more than in the rest of the book we can see how thoroughly the author understands the character of the Apostle and how deftly he translates that insight into clear and understandable language. He raises to a new level of understanding the conflicts which must have existed in St. Paul's mind by a deeper appreciation of what it meant to St. Paul to be an evangelist.

Many will feel that the briefer part three, "The Man in Christ," is of less value in a study of the life of Paul, but as we have been led to expect, the author is here on a par with his other excursions into the enigmatic character and career of the great itinerant evangelist. He goes to the heart of the matter when he says that St. Paul never thought of his knowledge of Christ as a "personal secret possession", but for him "the meaning of Christ is a shared meaning—the basis of that particular *koinônia*, or community, which is the church." In this section he describes St. Paul as far less a theologian in the technical sense than a man who was driven by a tremendous religious experience. This idea is not particularly new, but it is essential to the understanding of so dynamic a character as St. Paul.

This signal contribution to Pauline literature will be standard for some time. Dr. Knox has not solved all the problems of a "life of Paul", but he has expertly handled those which he considers focal, and for this work the student will be deeply indebted to him.

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

JULES L. MOREAU

*Gregorius van Nyssa: Oratio Catechetica.* Ingeleid en vertaald door Dr. W. C. van Unnik. Pp. 171. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Holland, 1949.

This volume by Professor van Unnik of Utrecht is part of the series *Klassieken der Kerk* which a group of Dutch church historians has been publishing since the war. Because of the importance of Dutch patristic studies it should be brought to the attention of theological students and libraries, as well as of all who are interested in the Fathers—a group which ideally includes all Anglicans.

Van Unnik's *Gregorius van Nyssa* is valuable to the American or English student not so much for its translation of the *Oratio* into Dutch as for the long introduction in which he examines the treatise and its place in the history of doctrine. Like Daniélou (*Platonisme et théologie mystique*), whose work he cites in the preface, van Unnik attacks current clichés about the relation of philosophy to patristic theology. One might also mention the similar work of Molland on Origen (*The Conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology*, Oslo, 1938). For too long the idea has been widespread in popular patristic studies that to think means to surrender Christianity to philosophy. Van Unnik points out the basic Christian concepts which Gregory sets forth and shows that his use of philosophy, in showing catechists how to teach, is governed by Christian ideas, especially that of "mystery" in the faith.

Van Unnik rightly criticizes the current fashion of studying "motifs" in the Fathers. This kind of study, exemplified (though he does not say so) by Nygren's *Agape and Eros* and Aulén's *Christus Victor*, does not do justice to the writers in whom the motifs are found and distorts their thought by neglecting its context. Van Unnik also points out the necessity of understanding patristic writers' basic presuppositions in regard to cosmology. Their background in "natural philosophy" and rhetoric requires analysis before their thought can be interpreted (see my article on the same point in *Journal of Religion* 30, 1950, 109-16). The real problem is that of the ways in which ancient Christians resemble and differ from ancient non-Christians. A vast amount of preliminary work remains to be done before this question (raised on p. 70) can be answered.

The kind of careful historical analysis which van Unnik gives the *Oratio* is, as he says after Harnack, an art. It is an art which the student who can make any use of Dutch will find exemplified here at its best. From a theological point of view we must also commend the book as a careful and sympathetic study of the relation between faith and reason in a Greek Father who profoundly influenced the Christian tradition. By interpreting Gregory as he does, van Unnik defends him from the accusations of those who use a caricature of his views (p. 67) to deny the possibility of Christian apologetics.

University of the South

ROBERT M. GRANT

*The Other World, according to Descriptions in Medieval Literature.* By Howard Rollin Patch. Harvard Univ. Press, 1950, pp. xiv + 386. \$6.00.

Material from Stone Age burials gives us clear indication that at a very early period men were thinking about that Other World to which one went through the gates of death, and hardly do written documents begin to appear in Mesopotamia and Egypt than we find men seeking to describe what that Other World was like. In dreams men sometimes crossed to it and awoke to tell what they had seen. "Revelations" from the gods told things about that world which were important for men's conduct here. At times a man might die and be mourned as dead, but mysteriously come back to life and recount his experiences. It was a world in many respects like this world, with its rivers and marshes to be crossed, its mountains to be climbed, its forests to be penetrated, with perils by the way from creatures both man-like and beast-like. Yet it was unlike this world in that many of the limitations of this life were outpassed there. Things impossible here were quite possible there. Life there was lived in more abundant measure. There the pleasures of life were greatly intensified, but its pains and terrors were correspondingly more dreadful. At a very early period men had come to believe that the good-living folk would receive in the enhanced life of that Other World the reward of their goodness, and the evil-living the just punishment for their wickedness.

But this Other World was not only the realm of the departed. It was the Unseen which is ever around us, peopled by its own spirit inhabitants, some benevolent, some malevolent, and some merely mischievous. It was a world which ever and anon would break mysteriously into this world of ours, and into which humans at times might in equally mysterious fashion break. A subterranean passage might suddenly lead to it; a door might unexpectedly open in a mountain side; a woods might prove to be an enchanted forest, or a castle beside a stream might have a magic chamber. The Oriental world was rich in tales of such happenings, and the ancient world of Greece and Rome had almost as rich a store. From both these sources stories concerning Other World experiences flowed into the world of medieval Europe, whence they have served to enrich in manifold ways the literature of more modern times.

Mr. Patch's book surveys some of the motifs derived from this lore of the Other World as they wind their way through medieval

literature, taking on peculiar characteristics as they develop among the Celts or the Teutons or the Latin peoples. There are stories of journeys to the Earthly Paradise, to the Isles of the Blest, to the Realm of Shades. There are visions of Paradise or Hell. There are enchantments and ecstasies, and strange otherworldly happenings which befall quite this-worldly knights and ladies, and there are pious attempts to allegorize all these tales of things of the Other World. It is remarkable how constantly such details in the descriptions, which we find as early as the literature of Mesopotamia and Egypt, keep recurring, though with different local coloring, in the later writings. The chief interest of this book is thus obviously to students of Comparative Literature, but Mr. Patch's assemblage of material contains a wealth of suggestion for even the general reader who has an interest in how men have thought about and written of that mysterious Other World.

Columbia University

ARTHUR JEFFERY

*Das Bekenntnis in der Geschichte der Kirche.* By Hermann Dörries. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1946, pp. 111.

These lectures, given at Göttingen in 1945, trace the significance of the confession of faith in Christian history and show that the German Confessional Church movement springs from this central stream of Christian life and thought. After a discussion of the nature of the confession of faith, Dr. Dörries briefly tells the story of some of the great confessions of faith from the earliest beginnings to the present. The confession of faith may be expressed in terms suited to the age in which it was first framed, but its sources lie beyond all human limitations in God. Confessional utterances of the New Testament, the Apostles' and Nicene creeds, the confessions of Augustine, Luther, Calvin and their traditions are treated briefly but deftly. When he comes to the post-Reformation period, the author centers his attention primarily on Germany. He shows how the confessional tradition was weakened, to some degree under the influence of Pietism, but especially by the currents of the Enlightenment. The nineteenth century was marked by a struggle to return to the central tradition, a struggle climaxed in the present century by the bitter controversy between the "German Christians" who were influenced by National Socialism and the Confessional Church. The

story of that significant conflict is told tersely and dramatically by one who lived through it.

This book is the forthright defense of a position by an appeal to history. The author has subordinated his material to his central theme; his own theological viewpoint is evident throughout. The book is a useful contribution to the literature about the confessions of faith. Americans may perhaps be especially interested in the chapter on the struggle within the German church in the 1930's.

*Union Theological Seminary*

ROBERT T. HANDY

*Christianity and Civilization.* By Emil Brunner. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949. Part Two, pp. 147. \$2.50.

*The Christian Doctrine of God. Dogmatics: Vol. I.* By Emil Brunner. Translated by Olive Wyon. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950, pp. 361. \$6.00.

*Das Menschenbild im Lichte des Evangeliums.* Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Prof. Emil Brunner. Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1950, pp. 185.

Part Two of Brunner's Gifford Lectures on "Christianity and Civilization" deal with the specific problems for which the more generalized discussion of being, truth, time, meaning, personality, and humanity, freedom, creativity, and justice in Part One constituted an introduction. The themes of Part Two will be familiar to readers of his earlier "Justice and the Social Order" and the still earlier "The Divine Imperative." One difference, necessitated by the demands of the lecture hall, is a new crispness of style and pleasing lack of the older repetitiveness. Another difference is the synoptic treatment of these problems around the focus of Christianity and Culture. The result is a powerful apologetic book. The chapters deal with technics, science, tradition and renewal, education, work, art, wealth, custom and law, and power.

"The Christian Doctrine of God" is the first volume of his new *Dogmatik* to be translated. A long prolegomenon illuminated by important insights into the history of dogma and with a defense of apologetics as an integral task of the Church as against Barth's denial is followed by a chapter on the "Name of God" which makes splendid devotional reading quite apart from its keen insight into the Name of God as the hidden secret of revelation in the Bible. An appendix on natural theology reaches some creative conclusions from the long battle between Barth and Brunner on this theme and vali-



dates Brunner's position as the more Biblical of the two. His warning against making the doctrine of the Trinity part of the *kerugma* of the Church to the confusing of the direct personalistic witness of the New Testament should be studied by the liturgical churches, but his defence of the doctrine as a theological necessity gives little comfort to anti-Trinitarians. The section on the divine attributes is refreshing in the author's insistence that these attributes are to be defined with reference to God's self-revelation and not according to the *via eminentiae* or the *via negativa* of philosophical speculation. For example, the omnipotence of God is wrongly approached as the *potestas absoluta* of philosophy but rightly as the God whose almighty power is chiefly shown in the loving condescension of the Cross. Despite this critical principle, some of the material seems somewhat disjointed and unrelated.

Critical for a Reformed theologian must be his treatment of election and predestination. Brunner demolishes Calvin's double predestination as unscriptural and a caricature of the God, who is Love, but equally shuns Barth's startlingly new reformulation of the problem with its consequent universalism. Brunner's own view is best stated in his words (p. 336):

"Both errors, the doctrines of the Double Decree and of Universal Salvation, equally eliminate the vital tension, based on the dialectic of God's Holiness and Love, by means of a monistic schema. Both try to evade the truth of the freedom of God, which is intolerable to logical thought. . . . The Biblical doctrine of Election . . . teaches the doctrine of the Holy and Merciful God, who in Jesus Christ has chosen all who believe in Him from all eternity, but *who rejects those who refuse this obedience of faith.*" (Italics mine.)

"The Concept of Man in the Light of the Gospel" is a "festschrift" for Brunner's sixtieth birthday with essays by French, German, Scandinavian, and American scholars. The one essay in English, miserably set in type by a Continental printer, is by Walter Horton on "Conditions and Limits of Man's Mastery over Nature". There is a particularly interesting analysis of the anthropology of Genesis by Franz Leenhardt. The volume concludes with a complete bibliography of Brunner's periodical writing and his books.

*Episcopal Theological School*

WILLIAM J. WOLF

*Basic Christian Ethics.* By Paul Ramsey. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, pp. xviii + 404, Index. \$3.75.

Emil Brunner in *The Divine Imperative* began the attempt to supply on Protestant principles the guidance in details of moral problems which the Roman Church has given through its text books on Moral Theology. His method is not without merits and it has been applied for instance (in one quarter at least) to reach a solution of the question of human artificial insemination. Brunner made a considerable shift from his early position when he produced *Justice and the Social Order*. In the process, however, he drew such a sharp distinction in the application respectively of Love and Justice that he provoked no little controversy. Paul Ramsey joins in the dissent and in *Basic Christian Ethics* has produced a full length treatise grounded in the biblical concept of "the Righteousness of God" and the meaning of Love revealed in that *Righteousness*. Reinhold Niebuhr calls it "one of the most thoughtful and comprehensive presentations of the subject which we have had in many years." The book is just that and this reviewer would add, "stated with freshness and vigor." The method and something of the content is revealed in such chapter headings as "In what way then are the teachings of Jesus valid", "Christian liberty an ethic without rules", "Christian love in search of a Social Policy." Dr. Ramsey aimed his treatise at the college communities in which the subject will be given consideration, but the publishers are quite justified in thinking it will prove useful in theological seminaries as well. The author moves with ease in classical expositions of ethics as well as in the writings of outstanding Christian moral teachers, Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther and Calvin, and thus the more conventional teacher will not be able to dismiss the book as "superficial". The startlingly different treatment should prove a distinct help in arousing interest in the traditional formulations.

The disposition to cut under whole tracts of the slowly accumulating body of thought on moral problems during the march of the church through time of which Dr. Ramsey's treatise is an instance, should not go unnoticed. A closer view of the book reveals that he, like all his predecessors, has to fall back on what he repudiates in earlier chapters as "coalition ethics." A formalistic ethics when used by a Christian teacher is as much a "coalition ethic" as is the teleological ethic which he all too easily regards as discredited. (F. C.

Sharp disposed just as easily of W. D. Ross's attempt in "The Right and the Good" to rehabilitate Intuitionism—and if he is right—and this reviewer thinks he has made good his claim—then the intellectual basis for Dr. Ramsey's departure is gone with it.) Teleology still stands and stands *firmly*. Amos Wilder in the second edition of his *Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus* comes out with a quite different estimate of the way in which the teachings of Jesus are valid—and that estimate of eschatology needs a teleological ethic for the arrangement of its data. "The end of man" may not be as adequately stated in scholastic morals as it should be but the topic itself claims the primary place it has had for at least seven centuries in the ordered thought of the church. That fact coupled with a clearer recognition that Christianity *starts out as community* (and is not simply in *search* of community) might have led to a more careful treatment of the place of rules in the maintenance of the community and the moral life of its members. The recognition of the *telos* of the community in worship, too, would have led to a different treatment of the love for God. This and other like observations, however, are but to say that Dr. Ramsey's treatise is *Protestant Ethics*. The Catholic will still need his books of Ascetical and Moral Theology!

HOWARD HENRY HASSINGER

*Seabury-Western Theological Seminary*

*The Christian Perspective.* By Edward T. Ramsdell. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1950, pp. 218. \$2.50.

The effort of the author, Professor of Systematic Theology in the School of Religion, Vanderbilt University, is to discover a "mediating position" between biblical and philosophical theology. Assuredly, he comes near to doing this although, as he himself would be the first to admit, the results are more in the direction of a possible course to follow than an absolute achievement. However, in his treatment there may be found vestigial remains of "moral idealism". Perhaps this is unavoidable if one is greatly influenced, as is the author, by the premises of "personalistic theism".

As a whole the book is an enormously valuable, and readable, re-thinking and interpretation of the Christian faith. The exposition is done with that ease which is grounded in true learning and deep spiritual discernment.

Chapter I, Faith and Reason, deals with this supposed antinomy by pointing out that all our thinking is determined by the process of selection, evaluation, or belief in what has significance; in other words our perspective. Meaning is prior to reasoning and value judgments are made not by reason alone but by the whole man. The Christian and the secularist handling identical material come to differing conclusions because their perspectives are dissimilar.

The second chapter discusses the importance of "paradox" as a tool for handling deeper and wider levels of meaning. Wholesome is Dr. Ramsdell's demonstration that paradox is almost inevitable in even secular philosophies, other than the most thoroughly monistic, and is not a recent invention of theologians who use it as a screen for their own failures in logic.

The next two chapters deal with the Meaning and Content of Revelation and Christ the Word Incarnate. Here is noticeable, despite specific avowals to the contrary, an unconscious tendency to make Revelation paramount or at least prior to Redemption; this being symptomatic of the "moral idealist". Other pointers in the same direction are: (1) The conviction that God's goodness is revealed in creation; (2) a slurring over of the problem of natural evil; (3) Christ as exhibiting in history "the actual life of God's goodness among men"; (4) that most dubious phrase "a moral universe".

Man and His Sin, Chapter IV, is a particularly penetrating analysis of the moral life and failure of man, both as an individual and as a social being. A clue to the origin of man's sin is found in Kant's *Religion Within the Bounds of Pure Reason* and in Kierkegaard's thought; both agreeing, for quite different reasons, that the inevitability of sin is grounded in freedom, man's highest capacity. This concept has been worked out in considerably greater detail by Brunner (*Man in Revolt*), Niebuhr (*The Nature and Destiny of Man*), and Temple (*Nature, Man, and God*) but no more persuasively than by Dr. Ramsdell. This chapter alone, as the saying goes, "is worth the price of admission."

The book concludes with The Cross: Its Background and Meaning. With the Atonement the author has quite a struggle to keep from falling into the usual subjectivism of moral idealism. However, the decision in that wrestling match goes finally to the Biblical view 'midst the cheers of this particular reviewer.

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

ALDEN DREW KELLEY

*God's Grace and Man's Hope.* By Daniel Day Williams. New York: Harper, 1949, pp. 215. \$2.75.

The best thing about this book is that it achieves a balance between the extremes of neo-orthodoxy and liberalism, but there are many other good things about it, such as the careful treatment of Nygren's *agape* motif and of Niebuhr's "impossible possibility" in terms of a redemptive view of God's kingdom. It is a book which provides a Christian foundation for hope in the here and now, as well as in the hereafter.

Williams sees clearly the danger of paralysis of moral effort in the pessimism of neo-orthodoxy. While neo-orthodoxy seems to rely on God's grace more than does liberalism, it actually makes too little a place for grace in human history. As illustrated in both Niebuhr and Brunner,

"there is a failure to recognize the creative work of God because there is a false doctrine of original sin which leads to a false appraisal of the natural conditions of human life. Both Niebuhr and Brunner affirm the need and the reality of redemption. Here too the interpretation of original sin works its unfortunate consequences; for now redemption is no longer an actual transformation of life; it is primarily sheer forgiveness of sin and the promise of an ultimate reconciliation beyond history. That this is somewhat qualified by both Niebuhr and Brunner, I recognize; but that is the tendency of their position" (p. 104).

While liberalism fails to recognize the tragic obstacles in the way of Christian behavior, and neo-orthodoxy puts the love of God outside of history and therefore is not redemptive in the world, Williams seeks to show that because God's grace is operating both creatively and redemptively, we have a basis for Christian action. The answer lies in a fuller comprehension of the meaning of vocation. Through this principle, we begin to see the Christian hope as a reality rather than a mirage, and when we talk about the "good earth" and the "good society" we are not guilty of romanticism. Growth in grace is a possibility and a promise, and there is continuity between the "old man" and the "new man."

What Williams has done is to bring together a number of divergent emphases into a well-rounded whole. His theology holds together, is relevant to the contemporary scene, and reflects the many-sidedness of the New Testament insights. He does not go overboard in any

direction. He makes use of the new process philosophy and sees the significance of Whitehead, Wieman, and Hartshorne; he insists on the principle of continuity as against the neo-orthodox emphasis on discontinuity; he is realistic in his doctrine of sin and the recurrence of temptation at every stage of life; and his New Testament doctrine of grace within the Christian community provides real hope for man. Thus the primary value of the book is its fresh restatement of theology and its relevance for today, and the secondary value is the critical evaluations of many assumptions among contemporary theologians which need this kind of careful scrutiny. The one unforgivable fault is putting the notes in an inaccessible place.

*Church Divinity School of the Pacific* RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

*The Oxford American Prayer Book Commentary.* By Massey Hamilton Shepherd, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, pp. xxiii + 958. \$10.00.

It is all here—everything the expositor of the Prayer Book would want his students to know as the distilled residuum of dipping deeply into a couple dozen books. It is all here in crystal clear non-technical terms—the origins, the changes major and the changes minor, the reasons for the alterations, the structure and the meaning, even something of the manner of carrying out the various services. Everything is expressed with an economy of phrase and with such transparent simplicity as to come close to the beauty of this “treasury of devotion” itself.

Dr. Shepherd follows in general the method of earlier *Teachers' Prayer Books*—a page of the text on the left hand and a page of comment on the right—with, of course, lengthier passages of introduction about such matters as calendar, lectionary, the Daily Offices, the Litany, the Holy Communion, the “Rites of Initiation” and the Ordinal. The learning, liturgical, historical, theological and biblical, thus epitomized is prodigious. The exegesis of the Epistles and Gospels and the suggested application of these eucharistic pericopes affords one instance, but the scriptural references to the phrasing of collects and proper prefaces applies this biblical knowledge to the smallest details. Familiarity with the fine points of the thorny problems of polity is revealed in the introduction to, and exposition of, the Ordinal. The history and meaning of the Apostles’ and the Nicene Creeds as well as the thirty-nine articles displays feeling for



the niceties of Christian Doctrine. The passage on the ceremonies at the eucharistic offertory and the prayer of consecration focus history and theology of liturgy in clarifying and criticizing contemporary usage. With amazing skill controversial points such as the epiclesis are so treated that all relevant facts are stated fairly. A firm confident hand is revealed in all that is touched.

This is a commentary on the *American* book. Conditions of life in the new republic and the swift changes in the last hundred and seventy-five years which led to departures not only from colonial Books of Common Prayer but also suggested further alterations in later revisions are not only noted but the correspondence of the revisers is drawn upon to reveal the reasons for amendment.

The priest who does not equip himself, and all who instruct, with this volume will miss one of the most potent aids possible for his teaching.

HOWARD HENRY HASSINGER

*Seabury-Western Theological Seminary*

*Nicholas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom.* By Matthew Spinka. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1950, pp. 196, with notes, bibliography, and index. \$3.50.

Among those most competent to interpret Berdyaev to theological students and interested laymen is the Waldo Professor of Church History at the Hartford Theological Seminary, Dr. Spinka.

The author treats his subject in two sections. First, there is presented a summary background of Berdyaev's life and thought. Secondly, the author deals with the basic tenets of Berdyaev's faith and his critical, mystical, and prophetic reconstruction of "neo-christianity." This method leads, unfortunately, to a certain repetitiousness, not too unlike reading Berdyaev himself.

The book is outstanding, perhaps indispensable, as an appreciation, a criticism, and a clarification of the progress and main conclusions finally achieved in the thought of Berdyaev. Especially illuminating is the author's perceptive analysis of the subject's faith as related to his own personality and experiences.

Notable values in Dr. Spinka's discussion are three: (1) Translations and quotations from Berdyaev's writings hitherto available, if at all, only in Russian. These are mainly from the period antedating the exile in 1922. (2) The careful presentation of Berdyaev's

"existentialism" in contrast to that of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, or Sartre. (3) The delineation of Berdyaev's dependence (unconscious for the most part) on the Russian Orthodox tradition, his intellectual mentors (Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Marx, Boehme, and Dostoevski) and his associates (including Bulgakov), and at the same time his independence of all. Obvious, to any reader of Berdyaev, is the paramount influence of Dostoevski. In the words of the author, "If he (Berdyaev) became the philosopher of freedom par excellence, it is because he had made Dostoevski's central concept his own, and had since spent a lifetime in elaborating it by applying it to every aspect of life and thought."

*Seabury-Western Theological Seminary* ALDEN DREW KELLEY

*Christianity and Society.* By Nels F. S. Ferré. New York: Harper, 1950, pp. 280. \$3.75.

Dr. Ferré is nothing if not trinitarian. This book is the third of a trilogy—*Faith and Reason*, *Evil and the Christian Faith* being the other two. The treatise is tripartite: The Eternal Purpose and the Historic Process, the Church and the World, and Concrete Considerations. Each part has three sections. Christianity—is *more than* society, is *true* society, is *for* society; The Church—the Incarnation of the Holy Spirit, the Distinctive Dimension for Christian Social Action, the Translating and Transforming Role of the Spirit; the Christian Perspective on War, on Property, and on Education. The clarity of general outline, however, is deceptive. The content is not presented point by point fashion, but as the discussion of a man who has read widely, thought deeply, and lived intensely. Here is the rich mixture that the busy conscientious pastor and the devoted and intelligent layworker will recognize as "real life" illuminated by shafts of clear light which enable him to see aspects he perceived but dimly before. Herein lies the book's value, and that value is not small. The tidy abstractions of more systematic writers have become so much a part of Dr. Ferré's thinking that he can bring many to bear on each successive point. This reviewer found three annoyances: (1) The application of terms which have had long and wide use for a particular concept to another idea which has appeared in Dr. Ferré's analysis. You have already noticed one: the Holy Spirit's relation to the Church is described as "incarnation". God's action when

differentiated from that which he performs in the Word and Holy Spirit is called "the Spirit of God". In like fashion Eternal Law and Natural Law acquire fresh meaning. The new ideas stimulate. Their labels obscure. (2) The very sparing use made of the background built up in sections one and two is the discussion of concrete issues in section three. The observations there are simply those of a wise, good, devout man. (3) The running together of the political-industrial, domestic, and educational fields in what purports to be three separate topics. The reviewer, however, found three special indebtednesses: Dr. Ferré's illumination of (1) the relation of Agape, Eros, and Filia in the Christian's life; (2) the relation of world affirmation, world renunciation, world transformation, and world transcendence; (3) the emphasis on Eternal Purpose and its relation to the (traditional) concepts of Eternal Law and Natural Law. Just to spoil the trinitarian pattern he will add a fourth: the relation of the Church and the World.

HOWARD HENRY HASSINGER

*Seabury-Western Theological Seminary*

*Drawing Room Conversion: A Sociological Account of The Oxford Group Movement.*  
By Allan W. Eister. Durham, N. C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1950, pp. 236. \$3.50.

The author, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Southern Methodist University (Dallas), undertook the study and sociological analysis of the Oxford Group Movement as a doctoral thesis under the guidance of Howard Becker. The method used is that propounded in Dr. Becker's *Systematic Sociology on the Basis of the Beziehungslehre and Gebildelehre of Leopold von Wiese*. The subject lends itself to such treatment because it is a "study of a specific religious movement small enough in compass and limited enough in time to permit intimate acquaintanceship with its representative personalities, activities, and documents" (Howard E. Jensen, Duke University, in the *Preface*). The purpose of this book is more in the way of a demonstration of a method than for the sake of any specific light on "Buchmanism" as a religious phenomenon.

After a brief historical survey of the Oxford Group Movement, Eister delineates the method to be employed, and then proceeds to make application to the material which he has gathered through at-

tendance at meetings, through personal interviews, and from literature published by the Group, its sympathizers, and critics.

The Group exhibits the pattern and behavior of the "cult", as distinguished from the "sect"; its religious experience is of the "thrill response" type; "the primary concern of participants throughout the history of the movement was for experiences in which they themselves figured centrally as individuals." "Although the Group disclaimed any specific program or philosophy of social action, the effect of its emphasis upon changing individuals one by one, upon individual responsibility and upon minimizing or resolving conflict, regardless of the situation or the issues at stake, was clearly conservative. . . . To criticize social institutions was regarded as futile, if not a way of dodging one's prime social responsibility, which was to surrender oneself to God." All this is characteristic of the "cult" type of religious movement.

As a "cult", participation of its adherents is segmental—"participants chose to conform or not to conform", and to the degree they chose. The process of "membership" (an inaccurate term in this context) is *elective* rather than *selective* as in the "sects". Typologically the Oxford Group Movement, according to Eister's analysis, is similar to Christian Science, New Thought, Theosophy, Rosicrucianism, and the followers of Father Divine.

*Seabury-Western Theological Seminary*

ALDEN DREW KELLEY

## NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

*The Meaning of Human Existence.* By Leslie Paul. New York: Lippincott, 1950, pp. 250. \$3.00.

Leslie Paul of London is a "self-educated man," a journalist of some note, a founder of a youth movement, and during the Second World War a lecturer on contemporary history for the Army Educational Corps. His book, *The Annihilation of Man*, an interpretation of the present crisis, grew out of his military experience. Its thesis is that the rise of Fascism and Communism is the result of "the failure of man's idea of himself," "the collapse of the image man had been forming of himself since Renaissance times." This argument, Paul states, led him against his will to a Christian conclusion.

The exposition of his conviction, the author sets forth under "the central Christian question. . . . What is the meaning of human existence?" The book is in three parts: the first dealing with the physical world as it is commonly understood from the "scientific" viewpoint of today; the second is an exposition of human nature taking into account current biological, psychological, sociological, and theological understandings; and the third deals specifically with religious experience and Christian revelation.

The author quotes from wide and varied sources (his reading is extensive to say the least), and in the progress of his argument brings together some strange bed-fellows—Schrödinger, Einstein, Julian Huxley, Darwin, Dilthey, Freud, Krafft-Ebing, Maritain, Buber, Kierkegaard, Péguy, and Berdyaev. The last named utters for the author "that pregnant phrase—God is the meaning of human existence."

A. D. K.

*William Law.* By Henri Talon. New York: Harper, pp. 106. \$2.00.

The subtitle of this book is "A Study in Literary Craftmanship". It is that, but it is much more. Talon understands the man. The qualities of his writing change as the man changes—from an ascetic to a mystic. In the early period as a controversialist Law fails in his estimate of men and so fails to convince them that Christianity is no escapism. In this period the short sentence is his vehicle. In the latter period he penetrates more deeply to the springs of conduct and develops myth and other symbolism. The style is fresh and soft. Talon insists that Law did not make the translation of Jacob Boehme sometimes attributed to him, though Boehme did inspire him.

H. H. H.

*Die Religionen der Menschheit.* By Anton Anwander. Freiburg: Verlag Herder, second edition, 1949, pp. xvi + 400 + 32 pp. of plates + folding colored map of the world showing distribution of religions. DM 16.

This book, revised and reprinted after twenty years, is one of the great works of German Catholic scholarship. It is unlike some other books on the history of religions in that it includes Christianity—and makes Christianity central. The justification is obvious—to churchmen. The author quotes Abp. Nathan Söderblom's *Int. to the History of Religions*: "It is more true of the Christian religion than of any other that its history cannot be fully told without bringing in all other religions"—*Von der christlichen Religion gilt wie von keiner*

*ändern, dass ihre Geschichte nicht vollständig geschildert werden kann, ohne dass alle anderen Religionen mit herangezogen werden.* Further, it is not necessary, from the Roman Catholic standpoint (nor from the Anglican) to deny the existence of genuine natural religion, natural piety, convenient grace, and the reality of the—sadly limited and defective—primitive and pre- or extra-Christian religions. Primitive religion was no “worship of devils”—at least not everywhere and always. Like Father W. Schmidt, the author believes that a primitive monotheism best explains the survivals; presumably, early men in various quarters of the world believed in “high gods”. But whether this goes back to a primeval revelation is another question. The scales are weighted, for a Christian, by the verse in St. John: “The light that lighteth every man was coming into the world.”

The work is an introduction, and therefore brief, but very well balanced. The illustrations are excellently well chosen. And the author's style is most readable. Further, pp. 295-378 contain a compact and useful *Lesebuch*, with the following ten pages devoted to a wide-ranging bibliography. F. C. G.

*Antiker Volksglaube.* By Eduard Stempelinger. Stuttgart: W. Speeman Verlag, 1948, pp. 247. DM 8.

This extraordinary work, which is well illustrated with plates and vignettes, is an account of magic and superstition in classical antiquity and of their survival in the Middle Ages and in modern times. The real religion of the ancient world, one often suspects, was far more replete with such things than with the noble thoughts and sentiments which we find in the poets—though there was no one standard, any more than there is for Christianity, whether Catholic or

Protestant. Some people always will be superstitious; we suspect that there were more of them in the ancient world than now—though the corner news-stands with their stacks of books on astrology, palmistry, numerology, etc., are significant.

This book is very detailed, even when a mere note has to stand for a paragraph, or could be amplified to a paragraph. It deals with the presuppositions, the belief in demons and the theory of sympathy. Then it describes divination and magic, astrology, the symbolism of numbers, and palmistry. Brief as it is, this will be a good guide to those who approach classical religion from the popular side. F. C. G.

*Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man.* By David E. Roberts. Scribner's. \$3.00.

The correlation of religion and psychotherapy, and their practical cooperation in hospitals and elsewhere provide one of the most fruitful areas in modern religious and theological activity. Professor Roberts, of Union Theological Seminary, has a wide experience in this area. For one thing, he conducts a course in collaboration with an expert psychiatrist; this course includes actual field work on the part of the students in a large mental hospital. Moreover, Dr. Roberts' background is that of philosophical theology. He is in a good position, therefore, to help interpret religion and psychotherapy to each other. The book is full of profound insights and genuine understanding of difficult mental cases. It is, moreover, written with modesty and a sense of proportion—qualities not too common in an area where polemics have often been the order of the day. He does not write of “the” Christian view of man, for there are many, though certainly every Christian view of man



looks upon man as a sinner. Dr. Roberts does not go the length of a theoretical portrayal of "the total corruption of man's heart"; nor, on the other hand, does he lambaste everyone who disagrees with him by calling them "superficial liberals". This wise and well-proportioned treatise ought to be in the hands of every parson, teacher, theological student, vestryman, and intelligent layman throughout the church.

F. C. G.

*Handbuch der griechischen und lateinischen Philologie.* Edited by Prof. Dr. Bruno Snell and Dr. Hartmut Erbe. *Die römische Satire*, by Ulrich Knocke. Pp. 110. *Der antike Roman*, by Rudolf Helm. Pp. 80. *Die byzantinische Dichtung in der Reinsprache*, by Franz Dölger. Pp. 46. Berlin: Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft GmbH., 1948-49.

For readers of this review the significance of these little books lies in the fact that they reflect the vigor of German scholarship even after the war, and in the relation of their contents to early Christianity. Knocke's analysis of the Roman satire traces its development as a specifically Roman literary form; when Rome began to die it died with it, although traces of the satire are to be found in Tertullian and the Christian polemicists who follow him. Helm's book on the Greek romance includes an interesting discussion of the apocryphal acts of the apostles and the Clementine romance (pp. 53-61). He rightly rejects Kerényi's theory of a religious origin for the romance and points out that it arises from a variety of interests. The Greek romance was unlike the modern novel because it confined itself to externals and did not attempt psychological analysis. Dölger's little book (only the first part of a larger treatise on Byzantine literature) deals with By-

zantine poetry, most of which was composed by Christian writers. The wide range of the "Profandichtung" written by Christian ecclesiastics is worth notice, although their "geistliche Dichtung" is more important.

R. M. G.

*The Mind's Adventure.* By Howard Lowry. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, pp. 154. \$2.50.

The President of Wooster College has given us, under an uninformative title, an admirable Christian philosophy of education and a persuasive *apologia* for the church-affiliated college. Christianity as giving integrity and wholeness to higher education is convincingly set forth. Dr. Lowry believes that the tide of secularism in American education is ebbing, and that in the second half of our century we shall see a renaissance of Christian education. He is a Presbyterian, and his college is affiliated with that Church; but there is nothing denominational about his book. Inspiring reading for all who believe that the churches have a continuing educational function.

N. B. N.

*British Humanitarianism: Essays honoring Frank J. Klingberg.* By his former doctoral students at the University of California, Los Angeles. Edited by Samuel Clyde McCulloch. Philadelphia: Church Historical Society, 1950, pp. x + 254.

It is appropriate that the Church Historical Society should have sponsored this *Denkschrift*, since not only has Dr. Klingberg made notable contribution to its own published studies; he has also devoted major attention to the part played by the Anglican missionary societies in the making of colonial culture. No man has made more effective use of the vast resources of S. P. G. documents. The ten essays included in this

volume by scholars who took their doctorate under Dr. Klingberg, recently retired after a third of a century of teaching and research, all fall within the orbit of his dominant interests, particularly the role of the Venerable Society in the colonies along the Atlantic seaboard and in the West Indies. Perhaps of widest appeal will be Bennett's account of the experience of the Society with slavery on its Codrington plantation in Barbados, which came to it by legacy; and the editor's essay on Thomas Bradbury Chandler, outstanding Anglican cleric in New Jersey in the later eighteenth century (and father-in-law of John Henry Hobart).

P. V. N.

*The Book of Isaiah.* Vol II. By Julius A. Bewer. New York: Harper, 1950, pp. 74. \$75.

This is the fourth issue in Harper's Annotated Bible Series, and includes text (King James Version) and commentary for the Second Isaiah (chs. 40-55) and the Third Isaiah (chs. 56-66). There is a brief introduction to each section done with Dr. Bewer's usual precision and clarity. The oracles are printed in verse form, with a commentary at the bottom of the page that frequently consists of a paraphrase or a translation of the text as Dr. Bewer would emend it.

H. G.

*Ye Shall Be Comforted.* By William F. Rogers. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950, pp. 89.

The first half of this book deals with the emotional components of grief and the consequent physiological manifestations; how the work of mourning can be facilitated; the role of a good counselor in a grief situation, and the strengthening effect of religion in helping one face loss.

The second half of the book is a collection of "Words of Comfort". Selections from the Old and New Testaments, from literature and from various books of worship are offered to the mourner as aids in overcoming and understanding the stress of the situation.

This small book has a great deal to commend it. It has successfully communicated in lay language current psychiatric knowledge about mourning, and offers many practical suggestions to the mourner and to the clergy for combating the destructive forces of grief.

F. W. V.

*Das Neue Gottesvolk.* By Albrecht Oepke. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1950, pp. 524. DM 28.

Dr. Oepke is well known to readers of Kittel's *Wörterbuch* as a thorough and accurate scholar of wide-ranging competence. The present volume is a survey of the whole idea of the People of God, not only in the OT and the New (esp. in Hebrews) but also down the course of Church History. Anglicans are familiar with the idea (see Hamilton's *People of God*, or Lukyn Williams's *Adversus Judaeos*); but the idea is strangely absent from some theological systems, chiefly continental, with the consequence that history is distorted, the Bible misinterpreted, and the noxious seeds of anti-semitism take root in Christian soil. A great deal has been said pro and con, about Hitler's descent from Luther. Perhaps we cannot settle that question, but something can certainly be done to rouse Protestant theology—and perhaps even Roman Catholic—from its acquiescence in the views that made Hitlerism possible. Dr. Oepke's book has a practical as well as an academic interest, and we trust it will do great good.

F. C. G.

*An Outline of New Testament Ethics.* By Lindsay Dewar. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1950, pp. 279. \$3.00.

Any one who like Principal Dewar has collaborated in writing books on Christian Morals (with Cyril Hudson) or on the ethical implications of Pastoral Psychology (with Cyril Hudson, Henry Balmforth, and Edmund Sara) must be driven again and again to examine his sources in the Bible. This is what Lindsay Dewar has done in an all too brief volume. After looking at the teachings of our Lord, "the Holy Spirit," St. Paul, St. John, and "other books," he comes to the conclusion that the quintessence of Christian Morals consists in the *Imitatio Christi*! Those of us who do not assent to this judgment need to canvass the ground he has covered before rejecting it afresh.

H. H. H.

*The General Confession in The Book of Common Prayer and The Confession of our Sins in The Book of Common Order: An Account of their Common Origin.* Edited by Stephen A. Hurlbut. Charleston, S. C.: The St. Alban's Press, 1949, pp. 9.

Once more we are indebted to Mr. Hurlbut for an illuminating contribution to the study of the Prayer Book. In parallel columns he prints the general confessions of Bucer, 1537-39; Calvin, 1542 and 1545; Knox, 1556, 1562; Archbishop Hermann's *Einfaltigs Bedencken*, 1543; the *Simplex ac Pia Deliberatio*, 1545; its English translation, 1547; and Cranmer's forms. One is led to the conclusion that, while some of these contain phrases that we could use only with difficulty ("conceived and born in sins"), they have a good deal of reality and freshness. Perhaps it is well sometimes to use different formulae for confession; familiar forms can so easily be-

come mechanical. What an experience it must have been to use the 1549 Prayer Book for the first time!

S. E. J.

*The Aeneid of Virgil.* A Verse Translation by Rolfe Humphries. Scribner, 1951, pp. 381. \$3.50.

Virgil is the pagan poet dearest to the hearts of Christians, and for many centuries he was thought to be a Christian—in some way or other. Many are the translations of his poetry, in all languages, but none ever quite satisfies; with the result that new translations are always being made. But none ever will satisfy completely, for no other language has the qualities requisite to convey the exquisite, studied, perfect music of Virgil's verse. This latest translation is good, and it is in verse; but that means modern verse, which is not always musical—while Virgil is musical, *always*. But the swift movement is here, and the steady on-going momentum of his epic lines; and we are grateful.

F. C. G.

*Bibelautorität und Bibelkritik.* By Erich Dinkler. Tübingen: Mohr, 1950, pp. 33. DM 1.50.

Professor Dinkler, now at Yale, delivered this lecture at the University of Mainz in November, 1949. It is a brilliant survey of the whole problem as it faces present-day Protestantism, for which the authority of the Bible is of paramount importance. The solution proposed is to distinguish sharply between revelation and the Bible—the Bible contains the revelation of God and is the record of it—because the revelation had *already* been made. This is a view not very far removed from our traditional Anglican view, viz. the Bible "contains", rather than "is" the Word of God.

F. C. G.

Frederick Denison Maurice. By H. G. Wood. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950, pp. 168. \$2.50.

Based on the Dale Lectures at Mansfield College, Oxford, in the academic year 1942-43, this book is concerned mainly with the place of Maurice in the religious thought of the Victorian period. After setting forth in the introductory chapter something about his life and personality and his reasons for leaving Unitarianism for the Church of England, the author discusses *The Kingdom of Christ* as the key to Maurice's thought. Then follow chapters on his critique of Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, the Boyle Lectures on *Christianity and the Religions of the World*, the publication of *Theological Essays* and the attendant controversy which led to his dismissal from King's College, London, and the acrimonious debate with Mansel (later Dean of St. Paul's) whose 1858 Bampton lectures led to Maurice's *What Is Revelation?* The lectures conclude with two brief chapters on the educational thought of Maurice and his social ethics.

Although small in size, the book is a fair introduction to Maurice by an ardent but not altogether uncritical admirer. A much more systematic and detailed account of Mauricean thought is found in Vidler's *Witness to the Light*, and it is odd that the author completely ignores it. Even though the Dale lectures were given in 1942-43, Vidler's book antedated the publication of this volume by a year or so.

Frederick Denison Maurice speaks to us as a contemporary voice if for no other reason than his view of Revelation. As against most of his contemporaries, who believed the content of Revelation to be propositioned truth, and contra Mansel who taught that

Revelation was only "regulative" truth (i.e. ethical), Maurice asserted that "The Bible is a revelation of God in action." This is a commonplace to us; but it was not in the middle years of the nineteenth century. No wonder Maurice was not understood by the Evangelical, nor by the Tractarian, nor by the Skeptic—e.g. Leslie Stephen.

A. D. K.

*Jésus*. By Maurice Goguel. Second edition. Paris: Payot, 1950, pp. 479. Fr. 1440.

The first edition of Goguel's famous *Vie de Jésus* was published in 1932, and was reviewed in this journal (XIV 364). It was announced as the first volume in a work to deal with "Jesus and the Origins of Christianity".

During the intervening years, in spite of World War II and the German occupation of France, Dr. Goguel has gone on with his work, and has produced two great volumes, one on the origins of Christianity, and the other on the primitive church. These also have been reviewed in this journal (XXXI 182). He has gone back now, and has rewritten the *Life of Jesus*, more or less in the light of the two volumes on Christian origins. As he says in the Preface, it is not only because of the new works upon the life and teaching of our Lord which have appeared during the last twelve years, but because "the problem of Jesus and that of the rise of Christianity are solidary, and cannot be studied except in relation to each other." The new title omits the word "Life"—the author has given up the hope of writing a "life" of our Lord. Like most modern liberal scholars, he recognizes the impossibility of that task. At the same time, his book remains a historical work, and not only that, but a work in religious history; and such a work can be

produced only by a believer. As Paul de Lagarde said in the 90's, "Those who have no religion have no right to speak about religion. Only the religious man can do so." At the same time, the life of our Lord must be viewed from two levels, i.e. that of faith, and that of history. The Christian revelation is not like that which took place through Mohammed, the Qûran preexisting from all eternity, and transmitted piece-meal through the Prophet. On the Christian view, our Lord himself is the revelation, and not just the medium through which the revelation comes.

Much of the original work of course survives in the new edition, even though it is "entirely recast". The main advance is in the direction of a more thorough application of present day critical methods. For example, there is a wholly new chapter (18) on the judicial organization in Judea under the procurators, a chapter made necessary by the consideration given (in Chapter 17) to various recent interpretations of the Passion Narrative.

There is a fairly good English translation of the original work (cf. XV 352)—though it contains a great many small errors. One may hope the English translation will be revised into conformity with the new French edition. Such a work would be of inestimable value to English-reading students everywhere.

F. C. G.

*Religion in Human Experience: An Introduction.* By John R. Everett. New York: Holt, 1950, pp. xviii + 556. \$3.70.

Advertised as a text for a general "Introduction to Religion", the book is taken up mainly with an historical treatment of four great religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Chris-

tianity. It would seem more fitting to call it a text for a general Introduction to Comparative Religion, but even so its adequacy may be called in question because of its slight treatment of primitive religion and Islam. The author apologizes for part of this omission when he says in his preface: "The reader can be consoled by the knowledge that most of the major religious ideas to be found in Islam are treated in the specific traditions of our study" (p. ix). But in a text one looks for information, not consolation, and this does not help us gain any clearer notion of Islam.

A. M. S.

*Hellenische Mysterien und Orakel.* By Thassilo von Scheffer. Stuttgart: Spemann, 1948, pp. 184, ill. DM 5.60.

A finely illustrated little volume introductory to the study of the Greek mysteries (Eleusis, Samothrace, Orphism) and oracles (Dodona, Delos, Delphi, Didyma, Olympia, Epidaurus). The book does not aim to set forth any new and revolutionary theories or solutions of problems, but to state the best present-day knowledge. There is a good bibliography, and the eight plates and numerous vignettes are explained in adequate notes.

F. C. G.

*The Epistle to Diognetus.* By H. G. Meecham. Manchester Univ. Press, 1949, pp. xii + 165. 18 sh.

This is a full-length commentary on the brief twelve chapters of Diognetus. The parallels in ancient and patristic literature are carefully studied, as well as the grammar, diction, syntax, and style. The work should definitely end the modern notion, still sometimes encountered, that the Epistle is a forgery.

F. C. G.

*Geschichte der Griechischen Religion.*  
Vol. II. *Die Hellenistische und Römische Zeit.* By Martin P. Nilsson.  
Munich: Beck, 1950, pp. xxiii + 714  
+ 16 pl. DM 54 (approx. \$13.50).

This is the long-awaited second volume of Nilsson's magnificent History of Greek Religion. Although the author modestly says that it is only a selection, and might have run to several volumes—and we do not doubt that Dr. Nilsson could have written several, all of them wise and learned—the work is most comprehensive and deals with the most diverse elements in the Hellenistic religious scene. It was a world that ranged from the most crass and stupid magic and mystery-mongering to the subtly refined spirituality of the Neoplatonists: in fact almost every religion in the world shared some of the qualities of all its neighbors. As in Vol. I (reviewed in this journal, Vol. XXX, pp. 64-67), Dr. Nilsson pays great attention to the social and political background of the religious life and thought of the age. Hellenistic religion was adapted to the times. If Tychê seemed to rule the world, or Anagkê—if Luck determined men's fortunes, or Fate—it was because in the actual world of Alexander and the Successors and in that of the later Roman Republic and early Empire, the individual was really more or less helpless as he faced the vast forces that shaped his universe.

Vol. II has had the advantage of a careful reading by Professor A. D. Nock. Out of his vast stores of knowledge he has added many useful notes, and has supplemented the bibliographies, esp. from American works, which are more or less inaccessible in Europe.

This preliminary note is not meant to review the work, but only to point out the indispensable nature of Vol. II for every student of the New Testa-

ment and of Early Church History. This is incomparably the most important History of later Greek religion that we have ever read. F. C. G.

*Whitehead's Theory of Experience.* By Ewing Pope Shahan. New York: King's Crown Press, 1950, pp. 140. \$2.50.

This discussion was a doctoral dissertation in the Faculty of Philosophy at Columbia University. It sets forth Whitehead's two concepts of "experience" (which in *Process and Reality* and other works is practically synonymous with "life").

The author views the earlier works of Alfred North Whitehead as expressive of a "narrow view of experience" involving Whitehead's extensional analysis, and believes that a new and "broad view of experience" from the philosopher's process analysis appears in the later works. This is the clue to the seeming inconsistencies in some of Whitehead's thought, notably *Science and the Modern World*, *Religion in the Making*, and *Modes of Thought* where there are vestigial remains of the earlier view combined with the later developments.

The book presents a careful and well documented argument. However, not all students of Whitehead will readily accept the author's thesis and particularly the sharp line of demarcation which is drawn between the two theories of experience. Least agreeable to many will be the contention that the concept of "presentational immediacy" is superfluous and that all elements of experience may be accounted for by "causal efficacy."

To the theologian the author's criticism of Whitehead's doctrine of God, set forth in this book's final chapter, will be the item of prime interest. Shahan undertakes the revision of Part V of



*Process and Reality* wherein Whitehead has an extended discussion of "God" in terms of a separate existential status and brushes aside, in a footnote, the view of "God" (*Modes of Thought*) as ultimate principle which can be experienced objectively. These concepts are not regarded as necessary to or consistent with Whitehead's process analysis. Accordingly, "God is simply the most important aspect of the hypothesis of life."

A. D. K.

*Poems by Christopher Smart.* Ed. with an Int. and Notes by Robert Brittain. Princeton Univ. Press, 1950, pp. xii + 326. \$4.00.

Christopher Smart has been known in recent times as a minor English poet of the 18th century, remembered for his "Song of David", and for the insanity that afflicted his later life in the peculiar form of praying in the streets, which called forth Dr. Johnson's comment that "it is greater madness not to pray at all, than to pray as Smart does." But Smart was a religious lyricist, says the editor of this volume, whose work deserves to rank with the best of its kind in English. The selection of his poems printed here, containing a number republished for the first time since the 18th century, goes far to justify that estimate. Smart wrote of himself, "By the grace of God I am the Reviver of Adoration amongst English men," and the theme of adoration composes not only a large section of his famous "Song", but inspires much of his other verses as well. As a poet he was an exceedingly original and intricate craftsman, and the wit and fresh beauty of his verse serve as a most appropriate vehicle for the essential joyousness and serenity in his religious attitude. The editor has contributed greatly to the rehabilitation of Smart's stature by his

just and careful scholarship, set forth in the introduction, and the notes; and the format fitly delights the hand and eye.

JOHN L. CASTEEL

*Gut und Böse im Glauben der Völker.* Second ed., revised and enlarged. Stuttgart: Ehrenfried Klotz, 1950, pp. viii + 132. DM 7.50.

A wonderfully compact survey of the religions of the world with the question in mind, What bearing has this religion upon ethics? What is its theory of Good and Evil? What does it propose to do with the fact of evil and the possibility of good in human life? In the chapter on Christianity an excellent distinction is drawn: Jesus set forth a new *ethos*, not a new *ethic*, and he freed men from the external compulsion of a written law—a view which Paul was to elaborate and defend, but which seems already evident in the gospel tradition.

F. C. G.

*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche.* Ed. by Walter Eltester. Vol. XLII (1949). Berlin: Töpelmann, pp. x + 263. DM 32.

*Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft.* Ed. by Otto Eissfeldt and Johannes Hempel. Vol. LXI (1945-48). Berlin: Töpelmann, pp. 288. DM 32.

*Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie.* Ed. by Carl Stange. Vol. XXI (1950), Heft 1. Berlin: Töpelmann, pp. 141. DM 30.

It is a pleasure to welcome back into circulation three of the great German *Zeitschriften*. The contents of the three numbers before us is most encouraging as a mark of the continued high standards of German scholarship. The ZST has a long essay by R. Hermann on the Evangelical concept of the church, followed by seven shorter articles, including a final one by C. Stange (the editor)

on the Prologue to the Gospel of John. ZATW has an important article by Eissfeldt on "My God" in the OT; one by Artur Weiser on Understanding the OT; and an extended *Chronik* by Joh. Hempel surveying recent archeological and literary work in the field of OT study—these in addition to several technical articles on the OT text and its versions. Old Testament scholars will revel in this work for a long time to come! The ZNTW has its usual quota of technical articles in NT and Patristics, but in addition contains two that are of general interest. The first is by W. Eltester, on the Crisis of the Ancient World and Christianity, the other Max Pohlenz's essay on St. Paul and the Stoa. We have recently reviewed Pohlenz's great work on Stoicism (Vol. XXXII 235ff), and welcome this supplementary study—which deals especially with Rom. 1-2 and Acts 17, incidentally criticizing Dibelius's paper on Paul's address at Mars Hill (see XXXII 240f.). Dr. Pohlenz emphasizes the Jewish character of Paul's thought, even including elements which have often been attributed to Stoicism.

F. C. G.

*Handkonkordanz zum Griechischen Neuen Testament.* By Alfred Schmoller. 8th ed. Stuttgart: Priv. Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1949, pp. xi + 534. DM. 12.

This handy-volume Concordance to the Greek New Testament is a great boon to students—and has been so, ever since it first appeared in 1869. Especially is this true of the new edition, which is based on the latest edition of Nestle's Greek Testament (which the Württemberg Bible Society also publishes); it has the Latin equivalents for the Greek words, as a help towards understanding and a guide for those wise students who make use of the Vulgate along with the

Greek. Finally, in a time like ours when prices of books have sky-rocketed, this modest price for a handsomely printed and bound volume—around \$3.00—is immensely welcome, not to mention the fact that some of the other concordances are out of print. Why don't our American Bible Societies do things like this for American students of the Scriptures?

F. C. G.

*Grundriss der Kirchengeschichte. Teil I. Die Geschichte der christlichen Kirche auf dem Boden der hellenistisch-römischen Kultur.* By Kurt Dietrich Schmidt. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1949, pp. 142. DM 5.60.

The first volume of a popular but well informed survey of Church History. The literature cited is almost exclusively German and the viewpoint is distinctively Lutheran. The author, Professor of Church History at Hamburg, divides the periods into the usual early, medieval, and modern divisions, and carries the story in this volume down to the rise of Islam. Within this framework his treatment is basically topical, sections being devoted, for instance, to the expansion of Christianity, the inner crises of early Christianity, faith, theology and dogma, Christian life, liturgical life the rise of the papacy, etc.

Although the volume covers familiar ground in a rather familiar way, it is clearly conceived and informative. It is refreshing, moreover, to read Church History written from a distinctively theological viewpoint, viz. that Church History is concerned with the story of salvation. The opening pages are an interesting essay on the way in which Church History is the history of the "hidden" Christ (*Christus in Verhüllung*), and on the consequent antinomy between faith and pure scholarship, which the Church historian cannot escape. The

author defends "confessional judgments" (i.e. those based on a definite Church confession) as the only ones appropriate to writing Church History. One might wish there were "ecumenical judgments" by which to avoid the narrowness implicit in this approach. For the author clearly does not appreciate Catholicism or the Catholic elements in the N.T.

C. C. R.

*Ruth and Jonah.* By George A. F. Knight. New York: Macmillan, 1950, pp. 91. \$1.50.

This small volume is part of an admirable series of Bible textbooks, called the Torch Commentaries, designed chiefly for reading by the laity. The language is simple; comment is restricted to those things which are either of first importance for understanding the material or would be troublesome to the ordinary reader; and the point of view, while in accord with the best critical scholarship, is deeply religious and theological. These books cannot be commended too highly to the clergy as a means of promoting an interest in Bible study among their people. The decision to treat Ruth and Jonah in a single volume is a brilliant one which in itself brings illumination to both these significant, but commonly undervalued, books. There is every reason to suppose that later volumes will continue the high standard set by this, the first in the Old Testament series.

R. C. D.

*Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.* Bd. V, Lfg. 6: *horaō—orgē*. Ed. by Gerhard Friedrich. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1950, pp. 321-384. DM 3.90.

Most of the current installment of THWB is taken up by the continuation and completion of the important article *horaō* and its cognates, by Prof. Mich-

aelis. The data amassed are of enormous value, and certain inferences that are drawn will have to be dealt with by biblical scholars from now on. One is the sharp contrast between Hebrew and Greek religion—in the one, audition is the important factor in revelation (the word spoken), in the other it is the vision seen. This distinction is of great importance for the NT. Another inference is the interpretation of *horaō* when used of visions; since it is not used of the opening appearance, Dr. Michaelis infers that its stress is upon the *presence* of the person revealed, not the fact that he is *seen*. This is a major point when we come to the Resurrection Appearances of our Lord. The point seems valid—but easily overdone, and cannot be applied without more ado to the interpretation of the *nature* or the "psychology" of the Appearances.

F. C. G.

*The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible.* By Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield. Edited by Samuel G. Craig, with an Introduction by Cornelius Van Til. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1948, pp. 442. \$3.75.

*The Person and Work of Christ.* By Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield. Edited by Samuel G. Craig. Philadelphia: ib., 1950, pp. 575. \$4.50.

Dr. Craig has collected the chief essays of the late B. B. Warfield on the two subjects indicated above. Warfield was professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology at Princeton from 1887 to 1921 and a leading scholar of the conservative Calvinist tradition. A good number of the essays in each volume is learned polemic against any but the conservative position. The first volume is an example of the way in which great learning can be used to defend the literal infallibility of the Bible; the constructive

parts of the second are like many such Christological studies written before the advent of literary and historical criticism. They furnish an interesting comparison with some contemporary works by "biblical theologians" who seem to forget all critical studies when they set about to write theology.

H. G.

*Pantheon: Religiöse Texte des Griechentums.* Ed. by H. Kleinknecht; new ed., abridged, by Walter Haussmann. Tübingen: Mohr, 1948, pp. 55. DM 2.80.

A very useful, beautifully printed abridgement of the larger work of the late Gerhard Kittel, Otto Weinreich, and Hermann Kleinknecht. The passages range from Homer to Julian the Apostate, and are exceedingly well chosen. The font of Greek type used is a joy to behold and to read. It is to be hoped that this interim printing—it belongs to the *Tübinger Nottexte*—will be succeeded before long by a reprint of the whole work.

*Nicolas Berdyaev.* By George Seaver. New York: Harper, 1950, pp. 122. \$2.00.

The author, who has written several books on the life and thought of Albert Schweitzer, tries his hand at an interpretation of the religious thought of Berdyaev. The result is somewhat less than successful.

The reader is given a one-sided exposition of Berdyaev's writings as "philosophical mysticism", a "philosophy of Personalism", etc. (phrases which no doubt would have been either meaningless or abhorrent to Berdyaev). The paradoxical nature, the lack of logical consistency, the strongly prophetic and ethical element, the theologically "orthodox" aspect of Berdyaev's unique ap-

proach are by Mr. Seaver either overlooked, misunderstood, or attributed to the fact that "his [Berdyaev's] own mind is not altogether clear on this point."

The clue to the author's hermeneutical bias he gives unwittingly (p. 9): "Long before he [Mr. Seaver] became acquainted with the works of Berdyaev, he had reached certain convictions in the matters of faith which, when he opened these works, he found corroborated and re-enforced with a power and intensity like the stimulus administered by an electric shock."

A. D. K.

*Die Bibliothek der Alten Welt.* Ed. by Karl Hoenn. Greek series. *Plutarch: Von der Ruhe des Gemütes und andere philosophische Schriften.* Tr. with Int. by Bruno Snell. Zürich: Artemis-Verlag, 1948, pp. xv + 311. Sw. Fr. 13.80.

*Stoa und Stoiker, I. Die Gründer, Panaetios, Poseidonios: Selbstzeugnisse und Berichte.* Tr. with Int. by Max Pohlenz. Zürich: Artemis-Verlag, 1950, pp. xxix + 386. Sw. Fr. 13.80.

This magnificent series of beautifully printed and bound translations from the Greek and Latin classics already includes a goodly number of volumes which will be of special interest to the student of New Testament and Early Church History. The selections from Plutarch include some that are not often found in anthologies or "source books", and the volume on the early Stoics (to be followed by three more) contains in translation many of the passages found in Von Arnim's great collection, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*. A long introduction by the editor and translator, Dr. Pohlenz, adds much value to the volume. His recent *Die Stoa*, in two volumes, was reviewed in Vol. XXXII, pp. 235ff.

F. C. G.

